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UNDERSTANDING
STATE AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Miriam Seifter*
Conflicts about the independence of executive branch officials are brewing
across the states . Governors vie with separately elected executive officials for
policy control; attorneys general and governors spar over who speaks for the
state in litigation; and legislatures seek to alter governors’ influence over in-
dependent state commissions . These disputes over intrastate authority have
weighty policy implications both within states and beyond them, on topics
from election administration and energy markets to healthcare and welfare .
The disputes also reveal a blind spot . At the federal level, scholars have long
analyzed the meaning and effects of agency independence—a dialogue that
has deepened under the Trump Administration . In contrast, there is virtually
no systematic scholarly attention to the theory or practice of agency inde-
pendence in the states .
This Article begins that study . Surveying historical developments, judicial de-
cisions, and legislative enactments across the country, it shows that state
agency independence is an inexact, unstable, and variegated concept . Where-
as federal courts treat independent agencies as a distinct legal category, state
courts tend to eschew categorization in favor of contextual holdings . Moreo-
ver, despite the common notion that states’ plural-executive structure ce-
ments independence, these rulings just as frequently undermine it . State
legislatures, for their part, revisit independence frequently, often in the wake
of partisan realignments . And their creations are diverse, combining a range
of vectors of insulation in different arrangements . The result is that there is
no single meaning of state agency independence even within a state, and
rarely a strong norm surrounding it .
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States’ legislatively driven, bespoke approach to independence offers insights
for scholars of both state and federal institutional design . The state approach
may yield better-tailored and more democratic arrangements . But it also dis-
plays raw partisanship, and the combination of weak norms with strong gov-
ernors may stack the deck against independence . The state approach also
raises deeper questions for public law: What are the costs and benefits of al-
lowing the rules of the game to be consistently up for grabs? There is no for-
mula for weighing these considerations beyond the context of any individual
dispute, but this Article provides a launching pad for their sustained explora-
tion .
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INTRODUCTION
Some of the most important decisions of law and policy, now and in the
coming years, will rest with state-level administrative agencies that have
some claim to independence from governors or other partisan leaders. State
public utilities commissions will substantially shape our energy future. State
boards of regents and education set the course of public education. State at-
torneys general, as heads of state departments of justice, play an increasing
role in challenging and influencing national policies. Other elected state offi-
cials govern topics from insurance to state finances. The legal status of these
potentially independent state entities is poorly understood but increasingly
consequential. Governors clash with separately elected members of the exec-
utive branch,1 and attorneys general, rising in prominence,2 spar with gov-
ernors and agencies over who speaks for the state in litigation.3 In some
states, legislatures or governors work to subject allegedly wayward inde-
pendent state commissions to greater political control.4 In others, stories of
government corruption are spurring calls to add or empower independent
watchdog agencies.5
1 . See, e .g ., Jon Kamp, Governors, Attorneys General Clash Amid Political Tensions,
WALL STREET J. (May 17, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/governors-attorneys-
general-clash-amid-political-tensions-1495042044 (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(collecting stories in multiple states); Jack Suntrup, Governor’s Administration Obstructed Au-
dit of Missouri Tax Refund Process, State Auditor Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 8,
2018), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/governor-s-administration-
obstructed-audit-of-missouri-tax-refund-process/article_d0c284d1-d7de-5662-a889-
53b5a53e7b3b.html [https://perma.cc/2K8B-K3D4].
2 . See, e .g ., PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015); Alan Greenblatt, The Story
Behind the Prominent Rise of State AGs, GOVERNING (June 2015), http://www.governing.com/
topics/politics/gov-attorneys-general-lawsuits-policymaking.html [https://perma.cc/JUQ9-
T3TX].
3 . See, e .g ., North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399,
1400 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (describing “the blizzard
of filings over who is and who is not authorized to seek review in this Court under North Caro-
lina law”).
4 . See, e .g ., Scott Bauer, Wisconsin GAB in Final Days as State’s Elections Authority,
MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (June 26, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
wisconsin-gab-in-final-days-as-states-elections-authority-b99751280z1-384455051.html
[https://perma.cc/BK7J-Z6X6] (describing Wisconsin legislation replacing a nonpartisan Gov-
ernment Accountability Board commission with two commissions “made up of partisan ap-
pointees”); Jesse Paul, Colorado Governor’s Power in Question as GOP-Led Committee
Advances Measure from Top Statehouse Republican, DENVER POST (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:27 PM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/07/kevin-grantham-bill-questions-colorado-governor-
power/ [https://perma.cc/WRP9-B2KE] (describing proposed legislation to prevent Senate-
rejected appointees from continuing to serve on state commissions).
5 . See, e .g ., Judy L. Thomas et al., State Leaders Split on Need for Auditor to Tackle Se-
crecy Issues in Kansas, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:33 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/politics-government/article185722893.html [https://perma.cc/VU5W-B46W] (describ-
ing proposals for independent Kansas auditor).
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At the federal level, scholars have carefully analyzed the meaning and
implications of agency independence—a dialogue that has only deepened
under the Trump Administration.6 The topic has especial resonance in the
current political climate: the President has strained or violated norms sur-
rounding independence;7 the independence of special counsel Robert
Mueller is of great public intrigue;8 and the changing composition of the Su-
preme Court portends changes in the law of independence.9 But even in a
period of possible flux, the conceptual terrain of agency independence is well
trodden. We teach as black-letter doctrine10 that federal independent agen-
cies are those with tenure-protected leaders;11 that such protection implies
some degree of insulation from substantive interference by the president;12
6. This coverage spans a range of mediums and topics. See, e .g ., SECTION OF ADMIN.
LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, IMPROVING THE REGULATORY PROCESS: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (2016), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/Final%20POTUS
%20Report%2010-26-16.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y7W-KCMR] (recommending
that independent agencies be subject to the analysis and review requirements of Executive Or-
ders 12866 and 13563); Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agen-
cies, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2018); Susan E. Dudley, Make ‘Independent’ Regulatory Agencies
More Accountable to the Public, FORBES (May 9, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/susandudley/2017/05/09/make-independent-regulatory-agencies-more-accountable-to-
the-public [https://perma.cc/8YVZ-ABQM]; Peter Shane, Donald Trump and the War Against
Independent Agencies, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 25, 2016), https://washingtonmonthly.com/
2016/11/25/donald-trump-and-the-war-against-independent-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/
GLY8-78CN].
7 . See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187,
2207–15 (2018).
8. Coverage of Mueller’s probe, and of his independence in particular, has become the
stuff of daily news. For just one of countless examples, see David Jackson, As Trump Attacks
Mueller and FBI, Critics Warn About Special Counsel Dismissal, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2018,
11:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/18/trump-attacks-mueller-
and-fbi-critics-warn-special-counsel-dismissal/436088002/ [https://perma.cc/M5HJ-5W3F].
9. As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored opinions skeptical
of agency independence. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Department of Justice has written briefs
asking the Supreme Court to address questions of independence anew. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.
Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1 (2018) (declining government’s request to decide the constitutionality of
ALJ removal restrictions).
10. Every major Administrative Law casebook features agency independence, with a
largely consistent descriptive definition. See, e .g ., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 121–147 (8th ed. 2017); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 237 (7th ed. 2016); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
203–301 (7th ed. 2014); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
916–22 (12th ed. 2018).
11 . See, e .g ., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 1163, 1168–69 (2013) (noting that “[c]ommentators broadly agree that for-cause tenure
protection is the sine qua non of agency independence,” and that in judicial and executive-
branch precedents, “the doctrine clearly makes for-cause tenure protection critical”).
12 . See, e .g ., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 773 (2013) (observing that “there is a sort of con-
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and that such insulation has a constitutional limit.13 To be sure, serious disa-
greements persist, including about whether the existing doctrines are the
best interpretation of the Constitution. But these debates only deepen a rich
awareness of the topic and its basic parameters.
One reason agency independence has received such sustained attention
is that it implicates fundamental public law questions. Agency independence
is a separation of powers issue, because it allows Congress, controversially, to
limit presidential power.14 Agency independence is also at the heart of con-
cerns that some policy decisions must be insulated from politics15—and,
conversely, that insulating decisions too much creates accountability prob-
lems.16 Because agency independence cuts to the heart of American law and
politics, it is no wonder that federal public law scholars have spent so many
decades studying it.
In contrast, there is virtually no systematic attention to the concept, the-
ory, or practice of agency independence in the states.17 Moreover, some im-
stitutional force field around independent agencies,” with “[t]he consensus view” being “that
presidents cannot constitutionally involve themselves in independent agency decision making
to the same extent as executive agency decision making, though the contours of that rule are
unclear”). As the Article will describe below, however, disagreement persists on this point, and
some of the commentators who advocate presidential control of such agencies now hold influ-
ential positions in government. See, e .g ., Eileen J. O’Connor & Susan E. Dudley,Will OIRA Ex-
tend Its Review to Independent Agencies?, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Apr. 26, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/
commentary/blog-posts/greater-executive-agency-transparency-and-accountability-through-
oira [https://perma.cc/4GFT-X5HN] (reporting that OIRA Administrator Neomi Rao “strong-
ly hinted that independent regulatory agencies” may soon be subject to OIRA’s regulatory re-
view process).
13 . See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493–95
(2010) (explaining a line of cases delineating how the president’s Article II powers create a
constitutional limit on removal restrictions).
14 . Compare, e .g ., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Law-
making, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 126 (1994) (“Insulation from presidential control, often ac-
complished through the establishment of independent agencies, restores a balance of powers
by preventing the agglomeration of executive and legislative power in the President . . . .”
(footnote omitted)), with Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 96–
97 (“The independent agency is a constitutional sport, an anomalous institution created with-
out regard to the basic principle of separation of powers upon which our government was
founded.”).
15 . See, e .g ., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institu-
tional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (“The insulated agency, its designers hope, will bet-
ter resist short-term partisan pressures and instead place more emphasis on empirical facts that
will serve the public interest in the long term.”); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established
by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1111, 1131 (2000) (noting that a founding purpose of agencies insulated “from the political
melee was . . . to safeguard the commissions from partisan politics, which would enable the
experts to make logical decisions based on empirical data”).
16 . See, e .g ., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1994) (“A strongly unitary executive can promote important values
of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the execution of the laws . . . .”).
17. Save for articles specifically on state elected officials, which I describe below, I have
not found modern legal scholarship on the general concept of agency independence across the
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portant work specifically on separately elected executive officials in the states,
like state attorneys general,18 seems to feed an assumption that states are
home to particularly robust independence.19 In reality, states’ plural execu-
tive structure raises, rather than answers, the question of legal and opera-
tional independence. We have not yet probed whether and how elected state
executives—and many nonelected state agencies and officers with apparent
markers of insulation—possess independence from political leaders.
This untapped inquiry has important implications. Most concretely, un-
derstanding state agency independence can shed light on pending cases at
the state and federal levels, where confusion about the respective roles of
state executive officials has vexed state and federal courts and led to denials
of certiorari.20 Federal statutory programs, too, sometimes require a state
agency to be “independent,” without defining what that means.21 More
broadly, studying independence in the states provides a clearer sense of how
states conceive of and operationalize their constitutional separation of pow-
ers. Zooming out further still, studying how states structure independence
can provide a new comparative window into federal independence and can
unearth deeper differences in state and federal institutional design.
states. For earlier views, see JAMES W. FESLER, THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE REGULATORY
AGENCIES 2 (1942); Charles Kettleborough, Removal of Public Officers: A Ten-Year Review, 8
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 623–26 (1914). I have flagged this question for future attention. Miri-
am Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L. REV. 483, 513 (2017).
18. Works on this topic include Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty
States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100,
2111 (2015); William P. Marshall, Essay, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006); and Norman R.
Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State Constitutionalism and Same-Sex
Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565 (2006). See also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The
Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008) (discussing state and local governments
as the primary example of an unbundled executive structure).
19 . See, e .g ., John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers:
Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1205, 1228 n.80 (1993) (“Independent election by the people gives those elected state executive
officials far greater autonomy, and far greater control over their departments, than any federal
official enjoys.”); Williams, supra note 18, at 573–74 (“Because these officials are neither ap-
pointed by the governor nor (more importantly) removable by her, the governor has little or
no formal influence over how these officials perform their constitutionally assigned duties.”);
Note, Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127
HARV. L. REV. 973, 992 (2014).
20 . See, e .g ., North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399,
1400 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
21 . See, e .g ., Wilson v. State ex rel . Office of Disability Affairs, 2015-1163, p. 4, 7 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 2/26/16); 191 So. 3d 603, 607 (rejecting a challenge by the terminated executive di-
rector of Louisiana’s Statewide Independent Living Council (“SILC”)—which is required, as a
condition of receiving financial assistance under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, to be “inde-
pendent from any state agency”—on the ground that “[t]he federal legislation mandating that
SILC be independent from any state agency does not specifically mandate that [the executive
director’s] position also be independent from a state agency”).
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With those aims in mind, this Article provides the first full treatment of
state agency independence. It explores the origins of independent state agen-
cies and officials and surveys their modern forms. The Article then uncovers
the legal realm of state agency independence—one that differs markedly
from the federal model. Unlike federal courts, state courts tend not to treat
independence as a distinct legal category, and their narrow, ad hoc decisions
that touch on independence neither follow nor seem to create a strong norm.
Rather, state jurisprudence largely leaves questions of independence to the
legislative and political domains. State legislatures, for their part, revisit in-
dependence much more often than Congress does, and they do so in innova-
tive ways that depart from the familiar federal design. I argue that this
distinctive state approach to independence—variegated, shifting, and often
politically charged—yields de facto, if not de jure, limits on agency inde-
pendence: How independent can an official be if her independence itself is
consistently up for grabs? In turn, the state landscape of independence has
theoretical and normative implications, which the Article examines.
In pursuing all of these questions, this Article focuses primarily on the
independence of state agencies and officials from the governors of their state.
That is not the only possible form of independence, of course. We might also
profitably assess an agency’s independence from the state legislature or from
outside interest groups,22 and this Article does provide some views on the
former.23 Yet an agency’s independence from the governor has particular
importance for both law and theory. In an era of rising gubernatorial power,
governors frequently claim authority over agencies or officials with markers
of independence.24 We need better legal resources to understand (if not easi-
ly resolve) these disputes. Moreover, at the level of theory, administrative
and constitutional law scholars have traditionally focused on agency inde-
pendence from the president. Focusing on the parallel question of independ-
ence from the governor offers a valuable comparative window and indicates
that the federal approach to independence is not inevitable.
Consider first lessons from state court decisions on agency independ-
ence. Unlike federal courts, most state courts have not elected to create an
overarching, transsubstantive doctrine of agency independence. To be sure,
every state has some case law related to independence, addressing subsidiary
issues like the selection, removal, and supervision of particular agencies or
officials. This Article describes such case law, both in the text and separate
Appendices.25 Yet in contrast to federal courts, state courts seldom make ex-
22 . See Barkow, supra note 15, at 17 (stating that “the creation of an independent agency
is often motivated by a concern with agency capture,” not just “insulation from the President”).
23 . See infra Part IV (discussing state agencies’ independence from state legislatures).
24 . See Seifter, supra note 17, at 515–18 (discussing gubernatorial directive authority
over state agencies); infra Section III.B.3.
25. Specifically, I have compiled three Appendices, each a fifty-state survey. Miriam
Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence: Appendices, SSRN (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369026 [https://perma.cc/K5K4-LNTC]. Appendix A details how
constitutional agencies and officers are selected in the states, and what powers they are given.
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press reference to “independent agencies” (or any similar phrase), and they
do not conclude from the presence of any one indicator of independence
(say, removal authority or independent selection) that the affected agency or
official must be independent from the governor across the board. State court
holdings on topics like executive appointments, supervision, and removal
tend to rely on particular positive-law provisions specific to the given official
or power, rather than any freestanding notion of agency independence.
This approach sheds new light on an important divide in federal separa-
tion-of-powers law. Federal courts regularly invoke an abstract, categorical
approach to agency independence and to separation of powers questions
more broadly. Scholars of varied ideological predilections have critiqued that
approach, arguing that federal courts should eschew such abstractions and
apply the commands of the directly relevant statutes and constitutional
clauses.26 State courts hew closer to the “ordinary interpretation”27 that these
scholars prefer. The state-court experience thus indicates that a noncategori-
cal, nonbinary approach is certainly possible, and it may well display the ju-
dicial modesty that scholars seek. But it is not all upside. State courts’ clause-
by-clause interpretation, combined with a tendency toward narrow and fact-
based rulings,28 creates a body of law that is hard to decipher. The resulting
confusion, I argue, impedes development of stable norms, thus undermining
independence overall.
Studying the state law of agency independence also complicates assump-
tions about the differences between state and federal executive branches. A
common notion, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, is that the
states’ “plural” or “unbundled” executive branches create more robust inde-
pendence than exists in the federal counterpart.29 That is not consistently
true. Although state courts do condone one form of independence that the
federal scheme does not—selection of high-ranking officials separately from
the chief executive30—they have not interpreted independence robustly
across the board. In part this is because, although many state constitutions
create executive officials other than the governor, most of the relevant claus-
Appendix B documents constitutional, statutory, and decisional law regarding gubernatorial
removal power. Appendix C gathers case law bearing on the governor’s power to supervise
agencies. I provide more detail on the Appendices in Part III.
26 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 773 (“Implying additional constraints on pres-
idential control over an agency beyond those specified in an agency’s enabling statute is a mis-
take.”); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 1941 (2011) (“[I]nterpreters should apply tools of ordinary textual interpretation to con-
strue the particular clauses that make up the constitutional structure.”). Versions of this debate
span decades. See JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 12 (1980) (describing and cri-
tiquing “clause-bound” interpretation of the federal constitution).
27 . SeeManning, supra note 26.
28 . See, e .g ., Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitu-
tional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265, 306 (2007) (commenting that state courts “treat con-
stitutional law as a species of common law”).
29 . See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
30. This includes both election and legislative appointment. See infra Section III.B.1.
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es also expressly allow state legislatures to prescribe those officials’ powers,
and in turn to decide whether the governor will supervise their work.31 Many
state legislatures have answered yes.32 Nor has state jurisprudence uniformly
limited gubernatorial removal power, including over separately selected offi-
cials. Here too, state constitutions offer legislatures leeway, and many state
courts have enhanced gubernatorial prerogative by reviewing removals def-
erentially or not at all. This is not at all to say that governors always prevail
in such disputes. Rather, this Article’s point is that the plural executive struc-
ture has sown more uncertainty than independence. Ultimately, state court
decisions individually, and their unevenness collectively, leave state legisla-
tures a wide berth to revisit and remodel independence as they see fit.
State legislatures, for their part, have run with their power to shape the
independence of state officials. State legislative tinkering with independence
seems to occur on the same plane as substantive policymaking, rather than
occupying an enduring status as part of the “rules of the game,” as at the fed-
eral level.33 In some cases, that involves plainly partisan actions after elec-
tions. For example, the Democrat-controlled Maryland legislature
authorized its Democratic attorney general to sue the federal government
without the Republican governor’s permission,34 and the Republican-
controlled North Carolina legislature and Democratic governor have been
locked in extensive battles over the governor’s power, including over state
boards and commissions.35 In other cases, adjustments to independence
have a less partisan cast and appear targeted at agency dysfunction or cor-
ruption. Either way, legislative revision of independence seems part of ordi-
nary state lawmaking. And, unlike at the federal level, the resulting
differences are not minimized by category-driven doctrines or conventions
about what agency independence means. The result echoes the finding of
one of the few studies of state agency independence, James Fesler’s concise
volume from the 1940s, in which he observed that states have followed “no
uniform rule” regarding agency independence; instead, “[c]ommissions and
31. Over two thirds of all constitutional agencies, and over three quarters of elected con-
stitutional agencies, authorize legislative control. See infra Section II.A.1.
32 . See infra Section III.B.
33 . See, e .g ., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitu-
tional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662, 665 (2011) (exploring how “the ‘rules of the
game’ ” become elevated “above ordinary political contestation”).
34 . See Ian Duncan, Facing Trump and a Republican Governor, Democrats Empowered
Maryland Attorney General, BALT. SUN (Apr. 16, 2017, 10:14 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-attorney-general-powers-
20170416-story.html [https://perma.cc/7DNY-HZDK].
35 . See generally Anne Blythe, Roy Cooper Sues NC Lawmakers Again—Over Appeals
Court and Industrial Commission Appointments This Time, NEWS &OBSERVER (May 26, 2017,
3:37 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article
152887174.html [https://perma.cc/U6Y3-698U] (discussing litigation by North Carolina gov-
ernor challenging legislation that reduced the size of the state court of appeals and eliminated
the governor’s power to appoint members of various state boards and commissions).
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departments, regulatory agencies and service agencies are independent or
not as their particular statutes may determine.”36
These features of state-level executive independence implicate both ad-
vantages and risks. On one hand, the common state practice of leaving inde-
pendence to an active legislative process rather than the courts may
(depending on one’s definitions) imbue agency independence with a strong-
er democratic pedigree than the federal parallel can claim.37 In addition, by
tailoring independence to specific contexts, state legislatures may wind up
with more accurate or fitting institutional designs.38 By honoring those legis-
lative choices rather than crafting a categorical doctrine of independence,
state courts avoid a criticism that scholars across the ideological spectrum
have leveled against federal agency independence.39 And by leaving some le-
gal boundaries blurry, state law may encourage cautious, collaborative be-
havior by executive branch actors.40
On the other hand, agency independence might arguably become too
democratic, driven by raw partisanship rather than deliberation or good
government. The instability and uncertainty of intrastate conflicts can gen-
erate suboptimal litigation costs and cloud substantive policymaking.41 Ra-
ther than prompting caution, blurriness may simply mean that each actor
vigorously pursues her own position.42 Because state institutional design is
often of very low salience, the decisions that result are likely to lack the
checks on partisanship that a public spotlight may bring.43 Moreover, the
modern power dynamics of state executive branches dominated by ever-
rising governors suggest that governors will have the upper hand in negotia-
tions.44 In turn, the state approach to independence seems structured to di-
36. FESLER, supra note 17, at 2.
37 . See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 7–8 (1996) (arguing that judicial “minimalism can be democracy-forcing”).
38. This tracks the rules-versus-standards debate to some extent. See generally Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 605–06 (1992) (ex-
ploring the factors affecting whether rules or standards will be more accurate).
39 . See infra Section IV.A.
40 . Cf ., e .g ., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compli-
ance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 979–82 (1984) (describing, in other contexts,
circumstances in which uncertainty regarding legal rules may cause over-compliance with the
rule).
41 . See infra Section V.A.
42 . Cf . Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent
Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 409 (2008) (“In theory, an unclear, am-
biguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal
authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, modern social science re-
search suggests that the opposite occurs. Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects
or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position.”).
43 . See, e .g ., Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018) (discussing the connection between salience and regulatory cap-
ture).
44 . See Seifter, supra note 17 (chronicling the rise of American governors).
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minish independence on the whole, or at least to place it continually against
the ropes. And while independence has its own downsides,45 it has long been
associated, at least as in some contexts, with core values of expertise, profes-
sionalism, and good governance.46 There is no formula for calculating these
costs and benefits beyond the context of any individual dispute, but this Ar-
ticle provides a launching pad for their sustained exploration—and for
building on existing dialogue with a new and comparative perspective. 47
Part I of the Article briefly reviews, for comparative purposes, the law
and norms of federal agency independence. Part II describes the origins of
state agency independence, noting how different eras of state government
expansion established different forms of independent state entities, including
elected executive officials, constitutionally created agencies, and other mul-
timember boards and commissions. It explains that these apparently inde-
pendent entities coexist with constitutional revisions favoring gubernatorial
control, creating a deeply conflicted image of independence in most state
constitutions.
Part III then describes how state courts have interpreted these varied
materials and mixed signals. Part IV explores the legislative realm of agency
independence, discussing its instability and creativity. It further discusses
how and why, unlike at the federal level, state agency independence does not
seem to be governed by “conventions” or “norms.”48 Finally, Part V consid-
ers theoretical and normative takeaways of the states’ bespoke and shifting
approach to independence.
I. FEDERALAGENCY INDEPENDENCE: A REVIEW
This Part briefly canvasses highlights of the law and norms of federal
agency independence. Mindful that commentators too often view state con-
45 . See, e .g ., Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View
of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223, 223 (describing the “functional critique”
that “[w]ithout clear lines of authority from one branch of government, independent agencies
are politically unaccountable, and therefore vulnerable to regulatory inefficiency and external
manipulation”).
46 . See, e .g ., Barkow, supra note 15, at 19–24 (identifying justifications for independent
agencies including expertise, nonpartisanship, and the avoidance of capture).
47. Beyond this Article’s focus on independence in the states, there are other valuable
comparative frameworks that warrant attention. Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell’s illuminat-
ing study uses “boundary organizations”—organizations like the Post Office, Amtrak, and oth-
ers that do not neatly fit the executive versus independent agency binary—“as a lens to
reexamine some classic administrative law doctrines about more centrally located agencies.”
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 852 (2014). Pro-
fessor Nestor M. Davidson’s work shows that understanding local administration “can usefully
throw core concerns of administrative law into relief,” while also showing common themes
across levels of government. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J.
564, 629 (2017).
48 . See Vermeule, supra note 11; Renan, supra note 7.
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stitutional law through a federal lens,49 my purpose here is decidedly not to
suggest that federal law provides the “correct” baseline, or that state law’s
differences alone imply any normative conclusions at all. Rather, this Part
sets the stage for the Article’s exploration of the state sphere because famili-
arity with federal practice can help to contextualize the significance of vari-
ous state design choices. This familiar federal backdrop can highlight ways in
which those choices are or are not distinct and suggest how particular legis-
lative and judicial choices may affect independence.
First, the vocabulary: by agency independence, the federal legal commu-
nity refers to the agency’s insulation from the president.50 This Article fol-
lows that approach by conceiving of state agency independence mostly as a
question of independence from the governor. Notably, scholars dispute
whether federal independent agencies are best understood as wholly inde-
pendent, or whether their insulation from the president is “simply . . . re-
placed by increased subservience to congressional direction.”51 But, perhaps
understandably given the high stakes for both theoretical and practical
meanings of executive power, the federal discourse focuses primarily on in-
dependent agencies’ presidential relationship.
Second, there is a well-trodden debate about the constitutionality of fed-
eral independent agencies. Those who read the federal Constitution as creat-
ing a “unitary” executive deem independent agencies impermissible.52 While
several Supreme Court justices seem to share that view, precedent has been
more tolerant of independence.53 Under existing law, agency independence
is allowed—and the president must respect the independence that Congress
lawfully creates—but there is some outer limit where it would impermissibly
interfere with the president’s powers under Article II of the Constitution.54
Third, there is a trio of crucial features of the black-letter law of federal
agency independence. Federal courts treat agency independence as a binary,
meaning every federal agency is either independent or executive (not inde-
49 . See, e .g ., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 766 (1992).
50 . See Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010)
(“Independence is a legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed by officials that
the President may not remove without cause.”).
51. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion).
But see Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 ADMIN.
L. REV. 259, 288 (2017) (finding, to the contrary, that Congress is less likely to oversee agencies
with features of independence).
52 . See, e .g ., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 599 (1994).
53 . See, e .g ., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493–
95 (2010) (extolling the idea of unitariness, but not revisiting precedent allowing agency inde-
pendence).
54 . See id . at 494–95 (discussing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
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pendent).55 The key indicator of whether an agency is one or the other is
whether the agency’s leaders have tenure protection (that is, are removable
only “for cause” or some similar formulation).56 And once an agency falls in
the “independent” category, courts imply some limits on the president’s in-
volvement in the agency’s work.57 Importantly, these three features—binary,
categorical, and across-the-board independence—are judicial choices, not
obvious legislative mandates. As critics have recently stressed, Congress in
fact creates agencies along a spectrum of independence.58 Other commenta-
tors, in perhaps a rising tide, believe the president must have “directive au-
thority over all federal agencies.”59 Still, up to this point, courts’ category-
based recognition of independent agencies has been reasonably well settled,
producing an understanding shared by courts, scholars, and law school clas-
ses.60
Fourth, federal agency independence is driven substantially by unwrit-
ten rules—that is, norms or conventions—shared by members of the legal
community.61 Even when an agency lacks tenure protection, these unwritten
rules may impel relevant actors to treat the agency as independent.62 Moreo-
ver, when agencies are categorized as independent, either because of tenure
protection or a convention regarding that agency, deviations from the rules
of independence are readily recognized as such.63 If the norms of independ-
ence do not squelch presidential meddling altogether, they equip legal ob-
servers to identify and decry the norm violation.64
55 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 772.
56 . See id .
57 . See id . at 773 (describing the practice of “[i]mplying additional constraints on presi-
dential control over an agency beyond those specified in an agency’s enabling statute”). Invok-
ing Justice Scalia, then-Judge Kavanaugh recently explained the rule this way: “As Justice Scalia
once memorably noted, an attempt by the president to direct (or threaten to remove) the head
of an independent agency with respect to a particular substantive decision is statutorily im-
permissible and likely to trigger ‘an impeachment motion in Congress.’ ” PHH Corp. v. Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Free Enter . Fund, 561 U.S. 477 (No. 08-
861), 2009 WL 4571555). This does not mean that the president has no influence over inde-
pendent agencies. See, e .g ., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 590 (1984) (describing such influence).
58 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 835; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B.
Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 559, 630 (2010); O’Connell,
supra note 47 (describing the traits of “boundary” entities).
59. Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 1205, 1210 (2014).
60 . See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
61 . See Vermeule, supra note 11; Renan, supra note 7.
62 . See Vermeule, supra note 11.
63 . See id . at 1186.
64 . See Patrick M. Corrigan & Richard L. Revesz, The Genesis of Independent Agencies,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 648 (2017) (noting “significant criticism” of President Obama’s interac-
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Finally, whether because of norms, path dependence, or other features
that make federal institutions durable,65 federal agency independence has
been a sticky phenomenon. Once Congress creates an independent agency, it
does not treat that agency’s independence as a choice to tinker with each
time a new legislative coalition gains control.66 Congress may well rein in
wayward independent agencies through informal pressure67 or through sub-
stantive or procedural rules.68 Moreover, Congress does sometimes termi-
nate agencies,69 and between 1932 and 1984 Congress had periodically
authorized the president to undertake reorganizations of the executive
branch;70 either of these actions could directly or indirectly limit agency in-
dependence. But that has not been the general practice. Presidential reorgan-
izations were not vehicles for eliminating independence.71 Nor have
independent agencies been favored candidates for termination. As political
scientist David Lewis has found, “agencies insulated from presidential con-
trol are more durable than other agencies” and “have a significantly higher
expected duration.”72 At a minimum, Congress’s choice of independence or
nonindependence does not change with each new political alignment.73
tions with the FCC); Vermeule, supra note 11 (describing a “firestorm of criticism” regarding
President Bush’s termination of U.S. attorneys).
65 . See Levinson, supra note 33, at 681.
66. This does not mean that Congress never alters the status of agencies—just that it
does not do so as regularly or casually as state legislatures seem to. For more detail on this
comparison, see infra note 73.
67 . See Feinstein, supra note 51, at 275 n.64 (collecting case studies demonstrating inde-
pendent agencies aligning with congressional preferences).
68. For example, Congress responded to perceived agency capture with myriad statuto-
ry deadlines and other action-forcing mechanisms. See, e .g ., Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the
Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57
LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 205 (1994).
69 . See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of
Agency Immortality, 64 J. POL. 89, 90 (2002) (describing this phenomenon).
70. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42852, PRESIDENTIAL
REORGANIZATIONAUTHORITY: HISTORY, RECENT INITIATIVES, ANDOPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1
(2012).
71. This may not be surprising given Congress’s possession of a legislative veto over
these plans. For example, during the Truman Administration, Congress vetoed multiple reor-
ganization plans, including some that would have centralized presidential authority over cer-
tain independent agencies or entities. See id . at 21. One prior version of the reorganization
statute explicitly precluded reorganization of a list of agencies, many of which were independ-
ent commissions. Id . at 12–13, 13 n.54.
72. David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presi-
dential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 377, 396 (2004) (addressing commissions with fixed terms and party bal-
ance requirements).
73. Thus, the point is not that Congress has never altered an agency’s independence;
this has occurred, particularly when Congress terminates an agency and transfers its functions
elsewhere. See HOGUE, supra note 70, at 13–14 (quoting 91 Cong. Rec. 9413, 9445 (1945)). But
these changes are a heavy lift and not an ordinary occurrence. For contrast, see Commission
History, ARK. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, http://www.apscservices.info/commission-history.asp
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The remainder of this Article shifts focus to the state realm. With refer-
ences where relevant to these familiar federal patterns, it investigates the
constitutional, judicial, and political determinants of state agency independ-
ence.
II. THECONSTITUTIONALORIGINS OF STATEAGENCY INDEPENDENCE
State constitutions today send mixed signals about independence. This
Part describes and historicizes the competing provisions relevant to inde-
pendence. On one hand, as Section II.A explains, almost all state constitu-
tions open the door to agency independence, including by establishing both
elective and appointive executive branch officials other than the governor.
On the other hand, as Section II.B explains, most state constitutions also
contain provisions that empower governors, including authorizations seem-
ingly more expansive than those the president possesses.74
Given the textual uncertainty, historical context might be a helpful aid:
What were the constitutional drafters, and the state legislatures filling in the
details, trying to achieve? The federal narrative of agency independence, after
all, is steeped in understandings of why Congress created such agencies75—
generally, to “foster[] independence from the President.”76 But a purposive
account of state agency independence faces two historical complications: it
emerged for varying purposes and is informed by greater subsequent consti-
tutional change. Most state independent entities were not designed to forge
independence from the governor, who was a weak figure until relatively re-
cently. Moreover, they emerged in bursts across different historical eras, and
must be understood both in the context of those eras and in light of later
(and sometimes continual) revision of state constitutions. Interpreters seek-
ing to ascertain the status of any given entity must, in Alan Tarr’s words, “act
as constitutional geologists, examining the textual layers from various eras in
order to arrive at their interpretations.”77
A. Signs of Independence: The Plural Executive
States today have various officials and agencies with plausible claims to
independence. For simplicity, I refer to these throughout the Article as “in-
dependent agencies,” although of course the extent of their independence is
[https://perma.cc/EXQ6-7S3D] (describing approximately twenty major reorganizations in the
Arkansas Public Service Commission’s history, including several switches from independent to
executive status). I thank Anne O’Connell for helpful dialogue on this point.
74. Some of these provisions were in the original state constitutions and some were later
added to centralize executive power. See infra notes 134–144 and accompanying text.
75 . See, e .g ., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 354 (1958).
76. Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 771.
77. G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 332 (2003–2004).
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part of the study itself.78 I categorize these into three groups, each of which
has a slightly different claim to independence: (1) separately elected execu-
tive branch officials; (2) constitutionally established (but nonelected) state
agencies; and (3) multimember boards and commissions created by state leg-
islatures. In the discussion that follows, I trace the rise of each of these types
of independent agencies and attempt to identify what their backstory indi-
cates about their intended independence. 79
1. Elected Executive Officials
Almost all states today elect some number of officials other than the
governor, and the vast majority establish this arrangement in the constitu-
tion itself.80 Forty-three states popularly elect an attorney general;81 thirty-
seven elect a secretary of state,82 thirty-four elect a treasurer,83 twenty-four
elect an auditor,84 and twenty-two elect a superintendent of public instruc-
tion or members of a board of education.85 There are other examples sprin-
kled throughout the country: for example, nine states elect a controller, nine
elect a commissioner of agriculture, and two elect members of a corporation
commission.86 Still other separately elected officials are specific to a single
state, like the board of trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and Louisi-
ana’s elected elections official.87
The selection of some executive officials separately from the governor
was woven into the design of the earliest state constitutions. As is by now
well known, most of the early state constitutions created remarkably weak
78. A more accurate moniker would be “potentially” or “apparently” independent agen-
cies, or perhaps “officials with a plausible claim to independence.”
79. For the view that state constitutions can be understood with reference to the period
of political development in which they were enacted, see G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 56 & n.120 (1998) (citing “studies that emphasize the periodicity of
state constitutions”). Obviously, this brief discussion will do no justice to the complexity of
state constitutional history. For works in that literature that look across states, see, for example,
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008); TARR, supra, and Williams, supra note 18. For
works on particular states or regions, see, for example, DAVIDALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE
FARWEST (1992).
80 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A.
81 . See id . In addition to the forty states electing attorneys general pursuant to their
state constitutions, which are identified in Appendix A, three states elect attorneys general
through statutory authorization. See IND. CODE § 4-6-1-2 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 180.020
(2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 151 (2015).
82 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A.
83 . See id . In addition, Florida has an elected official called the “Chief Financial Officer,”
who serves as the state’s chief fiscal officer. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4–5.
84 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A.
85 . See id .
86 . See id .
87 . See id .
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governorships.88 The drafters of those constitutions sought to avoid the
abuses of executive power they suffered at the hands of colonial governors.89
It was of a piece with that spirit of chief-executive limitations to divide up
executive power. Each of the original thirteen states provided for an attorney
general selected separately from the governor.90 And there were others: for
example, the Massachusetts Constitution established a Solicitor General, and
the original Virginia Constitution established a Secretary.91 Constitutions
drafted later (as most were) continued the practice of establishing separately
selected executive officials.92
In the mid-nineteenth century, and consistent with tenets of Jacksonian
democracy, many states provided for the popular election, rather than ap-
pointment or legislative election, of their existing executive officials.93 Other
states added executive positions for the first time and created them as elec-
tive offices.94 Direct election was thought to enhance accountability to the
public and to reduce the patronage that had emerged through legislative se-
lection of executive officials.95 Another wave of elected positions occurred in
southern states during or after Reconstruction, rooted in frustration with
legislative or gubernatorial overreach.96 Yet electing so many officials caused
its own problems, and the reformers of the “Short Ballot Movement” that
followed sought to limit the number of separately elected officials.97 The re-
88 . See, e .g ., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 135–49 (1969).
89 . See id .
90. Marshall, supra note 18, at 2450. For greater detail on when and how states provided
for the selection of attorneys general, see BYRON R. ABERNATHY, SOME PERSISTINGQUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE EXECUTIVE 32–33 (1960); JEWELL CASS PHILLIPS,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 207–08 (1954). These and other resources are
gathered in a more recent article, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the
State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31 (1993).
91. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2d, ch. II, § I, art. IX; VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 35–36.
92 . See, e .g ., IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IV, § 24 (creating treasurer and auditor elected by
legislature); IND. CONST., art. V, § 1 (amended 1970) (switching those officials to popular elec-
tion); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. VII, §§ 1–2 (establishing popular election of governor, lieu-
tenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, auditor, and superintendent of
public instruction).
93 . See, e .g ., V.O. KEY, JR., AMERICAN STATE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 197 (1956)
(describing the Jacksonian emergence of popular election of executive officers).
94 . See, e .g ., CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. V, § 20 (providing for election of comptroller,
treasurer, attorney general, and surveyor general).
95 . See KEY, supra note 93, at 197.
96 . See TALBOT D’ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION 137–38 (2d ed.
2017) (explaining that Florida’s “unique institution” of an elected Cabinet arose “as a reaction
to a more powerful governor during Reconstruction”); John C. Eastman, When Did Education
Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776-
1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 28 (1998) (stating that multiple southern states established
elected education superintendents in part to insulate education from the legislature).
97. Woodrow Wilson, for example, wrote that “making all offices elective” had been a
mistake, Woodrow Wilson, Hide-and-Seek Politics, 191 N. AM. REV. 585, 599 (1910), and that
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formers made gradual progress but did not achieve the systematic overhaul
they urged;98 numerous officials remained, and remain today, elected.
These separately elected executive branch officials may be the quintes-
sential symbols of state agency independence, inasmuch as they are the icons
of the plural or “unbundled” executive structure.99 But this view faces both
textual and historical complications.
As a textual (or structural) matter, the inference of independence rests
largely on the official’s separate, popular selection. But separate selection is
not synonymous with independence; the latter has multiple drivers. What is
striking about the plural executive structure is how little state constitutions
say—despite their well-earned reputation for verbosity overall100—about
how separately elected officials are to interact with the governor after their
election. By my tally, state constitutions establish 497 constitutional offices,
210 of which are separately elected.101 Of those provisions, virtually none ad-
dress the office’s relationship with the governor, much less prescribe inde-
pendence from her.102 Indeed, roughly two-thirds of all state constitutional
offices, and over three-quarters of elected constitutional offices, do not have
express constitutional powers.103 Rather, the constitution leaves their powers
to be filled in substantially, or sometimes entirely, by the legislature.104
Moreover, as Part III details further, few state constitutions resolve the gov-
ernor’s removal powers, even as to separately elected officials. Separately
elected officials might be independent, in purpose or in practice, but the
constitutional text does not resolve that.
Were these officials meant to be independent of the governor? The an-
swers here vary. Particularly in the earliest state constitutions, the plural ex-
“the short ballot [was] the key to the whole problem of the restoration of popular government
in this country,” THE NAT’L SHORT BALLOT ORG., THE SHORT BALLOT: A MOVEMENT TO
SIMPLIFY POLITICS 29 (1916).
98 . See BERNARD HIRSCHHORN, DEMOCRACY REFORMED: RICHARD SPENCER CHILDS
ANDHIS FIGHT FOR BETTERGOVERNMENT 58 (1997).
99. Berry & Gersen, supra note 18. Although I refer to these officials as “executive” for
narrative ease, some states—as I discuss further below—find that certain agencies or elected
officials are not within any branch of government. See, e .g ., Opinion of the Justices, 2015 ME
27, ¶ 8, 112 A.3d 926, 932 (stating that the Maine Attorney General “does not fall within any
particular branch of government”).
100. Justice Hans Linde colorfully observed: “Most state constitutions are dusty stuff—
too much detail, too much diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too
much preoccupation with offices, their composition and administration, and forever with
money, money, money.” Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts,
18 GA. L. REV. 165, 196 (1984).
101 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A (identifying the names, selection method,
and powers of each state’s constitutional offices).
102. The few provisions that do address elected officials’ relationship with the governor
point the other way. See, e .g ., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13 (“Subject to the powers and duties of the
Governor, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State.”).
103 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A.
104 . See id .
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ecutive structure coincided with other efforts to ensure limited gubernatorial
power.105 It thus may be proper to say, as the Minnesota Supreme Court has,
that some state constitutions reflect a “conscious effort,” given the “colonial
aversion to royal governors who possessed unified executive powers,” to “di-
vide[] the executive powers of state government.”106 States that chose an
elected plural executive due to Jacksonian instincts, however, were primarily
seeking to reduce legislative and machine corruption. They tended to be
more sympathetic to chief executive power, and gubernatorial insulation
may have been more an incident than an aim for them.107 Later creations of
elected executives, including those during and after Reconstruction, may or
may not have intended gubernatorial insulation, depending on the politics
that spurred them.108
2. Constitutional Agencies
State constitutions also establish numerous agencies that are not elected.
For example, twenty-eight state constitutions feature appointed state boards
of education, boards of regents for public universities, or both.109 Nine con-
stitutions create commissions regulating state government employment or
compensation, four constitutions establish an appointed tax commission, six
more create a wildlife commission or board, and three create an appointed
labor commission.110 In addition, a number of state constitutions include
unique appointive agencies, like Arkansas’s State Geologist, California’s Di-
rector of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Ohio’s Livestock Care Standards
Board.111 Some offices in this category have oscillated between elective and
appointive status.112
Here again, the text is indeterminate—most provisions simply do not
answer how the offices should interact with the governorship.113 What about
the history: Was independence from the governor part of the design of these
offices? For that matter, why did states choose to enshrine these offices in the
constitution rather than statute, and why appoint rather than elect?
105 . SeeWOOD, supra note 88, at 446.
106. State ex rel .Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986).
107 . See, e .g ., Herbert Croly, State Political Reorganization, 8 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N
122, 124 (1911) (stating that “Jacksonian Democrats . . . dealt the [state] legislature a body
blow” and “placed more confidence in the executive than in the legislature”); Louis E. Lambert,
The Executive Article, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 185, 186–87
(W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960) (describing how Jacksonians increased gubernatorial power,
though also limiting it through direct election of executive officers).
108 . See supra note 96.
109 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A.
110 . See id .
111 . See id .
112. For example, the Superintendent of Education in Alabama was an elected position
until 1969, when it became an appointed position. Id .
113 . See id .
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The choice to constitutionalize an office has usually corresponded to its
perceived import. Education, in particular, has long been a fundamental is-
sue and a constitutional matter in the states.114 The state corporation and la-
bor commissions were also viewed as too important to leave to legislative
chance.115 Most of these were established in Progressive-Era constitutions,
when concerns about business and labor issues dominated national politics
and several states “attempted to head off” judicial opposition to state regula-
tion of large enterprises “by constitutionalizing their ‘suspicion of big busi-
ness.’ ”116 In other cases, the creation of a constitutional agency was more
idiosyncratic—a response to a discrete incident or particularly heated con-
troversy.117
On the choice of appointment over election, the most pervasive explana-
tion relates back to the short ballot movement. After the long ballot had lost
its luster, states often turned to gubernatorial appointment as the preferred
means of avoiding political corruption and enhancing accountability.118
Constitutional scholar John Mabry Mathews echoed this view when he noted
in 1917, regarding state boards of education, that “[i]n order to secure a non-
partisan board, popular election should be avoided.”119 Notably, however,
the selection method of numerous constitutional agencies has varied over
time. Virginia’s State Corporation Commission was originally appointed by
the governor, then elected, then appointed by the governor, and ultimately
elected by the state legislature.120 Alabama’s Board of Education was initially
114 . See, e .g ., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES 67–105
(2013) (explaining the history of state constitutions’ inclusion of education rights).
115 . See id . at 106–45 (explaining the history of state constitutions’ labor provisions); see
also JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 405 (2d ed. 2013) (stating that the
Arizona Constitution’s inclusion of a mine inspector “illustrate[s] the prominence of the min-
ing industry in Arizona at statehood, and the pro-labor framers’ determination—in reaction to
mining company domination of territorial government—to make its government regulator
directly accountable to the people”).
116. John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 88–89
(1988) (quoting LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORY OFAMERICAN LAW 351 (2d ed. 1985)).
117 . See, e .g ., THE OHIO STATE UNIV. COLL. OF VETERINARY MED. & UNIV. OF MINN.
COLL. OF VETERINARY MED., THE OHIO LIVESTOCK CARE STANDARDS BOARD (2011),
https://vet.osu.edu/sites/vet.osu.edu/files/documents/about/history/Final%20Copy%20of%20C
ase%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG7F-YFJZ] (describing the creation of the Ohio Livestock
Care Standards Board as a means of defeating a Humane Society ballot initiative).
118 . See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 98, at 27–62. In some instances, the agency’s structure
may also have been a function of the state practice of borrowing provisions from other consti-
tutions. See generally TARR, supra note 79, at 50–55 (describing state borrowing). Other posi-
tions (like Wyoming’s state geologist) may have been regarded as requiring too much
specialized expertise for popular election. See WYO. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (repealed 1990) (“No
person shall be appointed to this position unless he has such theoretical knowledge and such
practical experience and skill as shall fit him for the position . . . .”).
119. JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN STATE ADMINISTRATION 306
(2d ed. 1924).
120 . See VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, SCC 1903–2003: CELEBRATING A CENTURY OF
SERVICE TO THE COMMONWEALTH 4, https://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/cent.pdf
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elected, then abolished during Reconstruction-era dissatisfaction with state
governance and education, then appointed, and now elected from districts
drawn to facilitate racial representation.121
Whether state constitutions intended to make appointive constitutional
agencies independent from the governor seems context dependent.122 For
some agencies, there is historical evidence of intent to insulate the agency
from the governor.123 More commonly, the stated aim was to insulate consti-
tutional agencies from politics generally,124 and if a political institution was
named at all, it was the legislature.125 History, like the text, is a limited guide
on gubernatorial control.
3. Multimember Boards and Commissions
States have also created myriad statutory boards and commissions,
many of which persist even after twentieth-century attempts at centraliza-
tion. Most of these entities are tenure protected; many describe themselves as
“independent.”126 Although these boards and commissions are not them-
[https://perma.cc/HVS7-7K4K]. Similarly, although Arizona’s Corporation Commission re-
mains elected, multiple constitutional amendments have proposed to make it appointive.
Leshy, supra note 116, at 355–57.
121. WILLIAM H. STEWART, THE ALABAMA STATE CONSTITUTION 222 (2d ed. 2016); see
also John Hall, Alabama State Department of Education, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALA. (Feb. 6,
2015), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-3656 [https://perma.cc/NFK2-S5SL].
122. It is not inconsistent to say that the governor can appoint an entity but not control
it: that is the expectation regarding both appointed judges and federal independent agencies,
and it also is consistent with Progressive ideals, which embraced both a strong chief executive
and a sphere of insulated administration. See, e .g ., Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administra-
tion, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887); Andrea Scoseria Katz, The Progressive Presidency and the Shap-
ing of the Modern Executive, SSRN (Aug. 1, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900936 [https://perma.cc/9GHZ-YGXJ] (discussing the views of
WoodrowWilson and Frank Goodnow).
123 . See, e .g ., Richard B. Crockett, Constitutional Autonomy and the North Dakota State
Board of Higher Education, 54 N.D. L. REV. 529 (1978). For an opposing example, consider
Florida’s State Board of Education, which was reconstituted and made appointive in 1998 in
part to increase “the governors’ accountability for education policy.” Michael D. Waters, Ala-
bama’s Framework for Public Education—A Survey of the Education Provisions in Alabama’s
Constitution of 1901, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 401, 403–404 (2002–2003).
124 . See, e .g ., ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION 235–36 (2011) (de-
scribing the 1970 shift from electing to appointing the State Board of Education as an effort to
“take education out of politics”). In a few cases this aim is present in the constitutional text ra-
ther than just in background materials. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (stating that the University
of California “shall be entirely independent of all political and sectarian influence . . . in the
administration of its Affairs”).
125. This may raise an interpretive question of whether honoring the original intent re-
quires insulation from governors, who are now powerful political figures, at least where posi-
tive law does not provide otherwise. Some state statutes do provide otherwise, as Part III will
explore.
126. A few states have made efforts to centralize control of independent boards and
commissions in the wake of North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v . Federal Trade
Commission, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015), which indicated that state officials provide “active
1558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1537
selves created by state constitutions, some state constitutions contain specific
provisions regarding “boards and commissions” as a class.127
These boards and commissions proliferated in the early twentieth centu-
ry, as states created them en masse to respond to new social problems. As
one study put it, “[t]he urge to create separate elective offices in the early
1800s was matched by a later zeal for the creation of separate administrative
agencies having no responsibility to the governor.”128 States were confront-
ing new problems and new endeavors, and “[e]very new line of activity re-
sult[ed] in the formation of a special board or commission until these
[could] be counted by the score in almost any state.”129 For example, as a
New York court recounted, its state government in the early twentieth cen-
tury had “a miscellaneous collection of 187 offices, boards, commissions and
other agencies.”130
This sea of new administrative entities in the states did not report to the
governor, and in that sense qualify as “independent” in our modern par-
lance. As Louis Lambert described it, “[a]lmost never was the governor given
any control over these new agencies. . . . Seldom was any recognition given
to the concept of administrative leadership by the governor.”131
supervision” of certain state boards to qualify for federal antitrust immunity. E .g ., H.B. No.
1425, Miss. Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/
2017/pdf/HB/1400-1499/HB1425SG.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB8L-2XCV]; see also Nick Sibilla,
Mississippi Becomes National Leader for Supervising Licensing Boards, INST. FOR JUST. (Apr. 13,
2017), http://ij.org/press-release/mississippi-becomes-national-leader-supervising-licensing-
boards [https://perma.cc/J2CV-GEH8]. Other states have proposed similar legislation, but
none has passed at the time of this writing. At least two states’ governors have implemented
greater supervision of licensing boards through executive orders. See Mass. Exec. Order No.
567 (Mar. 28, 2016), https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/392840/
ocn456714827-2016-eo567.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUX7-P7R7]; Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-33
(July 17, 2015), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/993.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TRB-
W67A].
127. Approximately ten constitutions have a provision regarding boards and commis-
sions. E .g ., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 26 (describing the appointment and removal processes
for boards or commissions that are the heads of their departments or agencies); TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 30a (describing the terms of office for boards composed of different levels of mem-
bership).
128. Bennett M. Rich, The Governor as Policy Leader, in NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, SALIENT
ISSUES OFCONSTITUTIONALREVISION 80, 84 (John P. Wheeler, Jr. ed., 1961).
129. JAMESQUAYLEDEALEY, GROWTH OFAMERICAN STATECONSTITUTIONS 165 (1915).
130. Cappelli v. Sweeney, 634 N.Y.S.2d 619, 624 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (quoting STATE OF N.Y.
EXEC. CHAMBER, REPORT OF RECONSTRUCTION COMMISSION TOGOVERNOR ALFRED E. SMITH
ON RETRENCHMENT AND REORGANIZATION IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT 6 (1919),
https://ia800200.us.archive.org/21/items/cu31924014005106/cu31924014005106.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PBB7-69H5]), aff’d mem ., 646 N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div. 1996). The case also
discusses past efforts, like the Moses Commission Report, to streamline the state’s government.
See id .
131. Lambert, supra note 107, at 187.
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B. The Modern Move to Centralization
The sprawling state bureaucracies that accumulated fed the movement
for gubernatorial control. Commentators and public officials alike came to
view state administration as “unwieldy, wasteful, and thoroughly unbusi-
nesslike,”132 and viewed state administrative reorganization as an “urgent”
matter.133 Reorganization, in this view, would need to centralize power un-
der the governor: “The activities of the government should be consistent,”
the thinking went, “and the more independent agencies, the more possibili-
ties for inconsistencies.”134 Subscribing to what reformers termed the inte-
gration doctrine,135 states began adopting reforms, both piecemeal and
wholesale, aimed at centralizing executive branch control under the gover-
nor.136
In some states, like Florida and Michigan, reformers amended the Con-
stitution to consolidate and reorganize the executive branch.137 At least seven
states granted governors powers of supervision;138 an overlapping group of
ten more conferred the gubernatorial power to reorganize executive branch-
es.139 Other states acted more stepwise, through more limited constitutional
or statutory changes.140 For example, states eliminated or consolidated indi-
vidual agencies, usually charging the governor with supervision of the re-
132. DEALEY, supra note 129, at 165. To be sure, governors were not always entirely
omitted from agencies’ design. Even in the nineteenth century, governors in some states en-
joyed some powers of both appointment and removal. For examples, see Eric R. Daleo, The
Scope and Limits of the New Jersey Governor’s Authority to Remove the Attorney General and
Others “For Cause,” 39 RUTGERS L.J. 393, 401–02 (2008).
133. John M. Mathews, State Administrative Reorganization, 16 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 387,
387 (1922) (quoting W.F.WILLOUGHBY, THEGOVERNMENT OFMODERN STATES 393 (1919)).
134. York Willbern, Administration in State Governments, in AM. ASSEMBLY, THE
FORTY-EIGHT STATES 111, 119 (1955).
135 . See FESLER, supra note 17, at 2.
136. Daniel Elazar called this the “managerial” trend. See Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles
and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, PUBLIUS, Winter 1982, at 11, 12–13,
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037380 [https://perma.cc/3KL2-T9MT].
137 . See, e .g ., D’ALEMBERTE, supra note 96, at 141 (characterizing Florida’s constitutional
amendments—in particular, Article IV, section 6—as “part of a movement toward government
efficiency that began in the early 1900s”).
138. Seven states refer expressly to supervision. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 24; FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 6; HAW. CONST. art. V, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4,
para. 2; N.D. CONST. art. 5, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 9. Several more states authorize gover-
nors to “transact all executive business with the officers of the government,” or use similar
phrasing. See, e .g ., ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 4.
139 . See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 23; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1,
para. (e); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 11; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. art. II, § 24; MASS
CONST. art. of amend. art. LXXXVII; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5, para.
(10); S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
140 . See Michael B. Berkman & Christopher Reenock, Incremental Consolidation and
Comprehensive Reorganization of American State Executive Branches, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 796
(2004).
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maining entity.141 Furthermore, governors gradually gained appointment
and removal powers.142 These clauses built on longstanding provisions that
had initiated gubernatorial power: the vesting clauses, take care clauses, and
opinions clauses.143 Taking the wholesale and incremental additions togeth-
er, the new mood of state constitutionalism was one of enhanced gubernato-
rial power.144
These developments might affect an interpreter’s view of agency inde-
pendence. They might suggest that, whatever state constitutions intended
when they first created independent agencies, they now envision a stronger
governor and less independence. This would be especially true if one believes
that the most recent changes to a constitution are entitled to special
weight.145 As Robert Williams has observed, a state court could observe a
pattern of increasing gubernatorial empowerment and “interpret[] his pow-
ers accordingly.”146
* * *
The picture that emerges from this discussion is one of constitutional
possibility: state constitutions hardly settle the matter of executive officials’
independence. Rather, they provide fodder that might be construed—by
courts or legislatures—to support or cabin independence. Parts III and IV
describe how state courts and legislatures have responded to that invitation.
III. STAGEAGENCY INDEPENDENCE IN THECOURTS
How have American state courts interpreted state constitutions’ mixed
signals regarding agency independence? This Part offers two core findings.
First, state court jurisprudence refutes the idea that state constitutional
structure is necessarily linked to robust independence. As noted, most state
constitutional provisions creating or recognizing separate executive officials
leave some or all of the powers, appointment, and removal of those officials
141 . See id . at 797.
142 . See Kettleborough, supra note 17, at 623–26.
143 . See DEALEY, supra note 129, at 162 (describing these provisions as common in the
states); Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
323, 342 (2016) (noting the early origins of these clauses in sixteen states).
144 . See generally LARRY SABATO, GOODBYE TO GOOD-TIME CHARLIE (2d ed. 1983) (de-
scribing the expansion of gubernatorial power).
145. For exploration of this interpretive approach, see Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpre-
tation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2001) (advocating “looking at older parts of the Constitution through the lens of more recent
amendments in understanding what the Constitution as a whole has become,” and considering
objections to this approach).
146. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 239 (2009)
(describing a New Jersey case following that approach).
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to state legislatures.147 In following both constitutional text and their charac-
teristic deference to state legislation,148 state courts have followed suit, ren-
dering much of state agency independence a legislative choice. And although
state legislation is an ever-changing landscape (a topic Part IV explores),
state legislatures have generally trended in favor of gubernatorial control of
the executive branch.149 State agency independence thus does not follow ine-
luctably from separately electing members of the executive branch.
Second, whether or not a constitutional punt to the legislature is at issue,
the rulings and methodologies of state courts tend to limit certainty about
independence. As Part III.A explains, state courts do not adopt a binary ap-
proach to independence like federal courts do; that is, they do not divide the
executive branch into agencies that are independent and those that are
not.150 Nor do state courts infer across-the-board independence from the
presence of one indicator, again as federal courts do.151 Their approach in-
stead resembles the “ordinary interpretation” that John Manning has urged
at the federal level, eschewing value-based generalities about independence
in favor of “clause-based” rulings.152 And many of these decisions go further
in their specificity, limiting their analysis not only to the agencies or offices
at issue but also to the particular context—the sort of narrow, thinly theo-
rized decisionmaking that commentators of state courts have both critiqued
and defended in other contexts.153
The absence of a categorical approach to independent agencies impedes
study of the topic, as it is not possible to simply review all state court rulings
on “agency independence.” Still, it is possible to get a window into the sub-
ject by studying state approaches to subsidiary questions central to inde-
pendence: the governor’s powers of appointment, removal, and supervision.
Part III.B provides an overview of those issues. Most states permit nongu-
bernatorial (usually legislative) appointments, subject to functional, often
ambiguous limits. But state courts blunt the effect of nongubernatorial selec-
tion through their approaches to removal and supervision. Regarding re-
moval, most state courts (following their constitutional text) leave the
standards to the legislature, allowing the legislature potentially vast ability to
147. For a breakdown of the grants of power to these officials, see Seifter, supra note 25,
at Appendix A. I provide more detail on appointment and removal restrictions in Section III.B.
148 . See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 693–94 (2000) (noting the “deferential
standard” of state courts toward state legislation).
149 . See Seifter, supra note 17; supra Section II.B.
150 . Cf . Datla & Revesz, supra note 12 (describing and critiquing the binary approach).
151 . Cf . id .
152 . SeeManning, supra note 26, at 2039–40.
153 . Compare Gardner, supra note 49 (describing state constitutional law as an inevitably
“vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements” in
which judges inadequately engage with state constitutions), with David Schuman, Correspond-
ence, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 276 (1992) (describing
the existence, possibility, and value of meaningful state constitutionalism).
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impose independence. But state courts also empower governors in removal
cases, either by interpreting “for cause” generously or by limiting judicial re-
view of removals. As for supervision, the relationship between the governor
and agencies is usually whatever the legislature says it is, subject to limits
that are sometimes acknowledged but almost never defined. On each of
those three issues, state court approaches tend to inhibit legal certainty.
One caveat at the outset: Like all nationwide studies of state law, this in-
quiry poses methodological challenges. A thorough study of federal agency
independence might consider a few dozen cases, but there are hundreds of
cases that address independence across the states, and understanding each
may require state-specific context. Still, as scholars of state constitutional law
have concluded in other contexts,154 there are generalizable conclusions re-
garding state approaches. In particular, it is possible to identify certain ques-
tions that are crucial to defining independence and then focus on state
courts’ answers to those questions across the country. Guided by that ap-
proach, this Part addresses several questions that are at the heart of whether
independence exists and what it means.155
The features of state court decisions described here—noncategorical rea-
soning, deference to the political process, and narrow holdings—all feed the
argument Part IV develops further: that independence in the states is neither
a clear category nor a strong norm. But first, I substantiate these characteri-
zations of state court practice.
A. Agency Independence as Neither a Binary nor a Category
First, the vast majority of state courts do not follow the binary approach
of federal law, under which each agency is either “independent” or not.156 In
addition to being nonbinary, the state approach is also noncategorical: most
states do not use the term “independent agency” (or any similar term) to in-
voke a transsubstantive category. A few state statutes provide a transsubstan-
154 . See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1241 (contending that it is “possible to make useful
comparisons among states with respect to basic principles of allocation of powers between
governor and legislatures,” and noting that “[c]ourts in fact do so”); Jonathan Zasloff, Taking
Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1084
(2004) (“Enough commonality exists between states that the field [of state constitutional law]
need not fragment itself into fifty pieces . . . .”).
155. My use of appointment, supervision, and removal as determinants of independence
is generally compatible with, though not identical to, other lists of the drivers of independence.
See, e .g ., Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 784 (identifying “seven indicia of independence: re-
moval protection, specified tenure, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements,
litigation authority, budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication au-
thority”); Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 972–
75 (2015) (asserting that statutory provisions affecting appointment and removal, as well as
provisions affecting an agency’s “ability . . . to make policy decisions without political interfer-
ence,” are important determinants of independence).
156 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 772–73 (describing one of the “fundamental
assumptions” about federal agency independence as the “binary view” that “agencies can be
divided into two identifiable, distinct sets: independent and executive”).
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tive definition of “independent agency,” though without judicial interpreta-
tion or a connection to the case law on independence from the governor;157
others use the phrase in passing and with little or no explanation.158 Thus,
even cases that implicate independence tend not to reason from a notion
that certain agencies or officials are classified as “independent,” much less
that any set of agencies or officials is independent in the same way.
The dominant, noncategorical approach is that state courts reach rulings
affecting agencies’ insulation from the governor without making reference to
any category or transsubstantive rules. To take one example of this dominant
approach, consider New Mexico’s case law on removal. In State ex rel . New
Mexico Judicial Standards Commission v . Espinosa, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected a challenge to Governor Bill Richardson’s removal of
the previous governor’s appointees to the Judicial Standards Commission,
which acts as the judiciary’s “watchdog” and handles complaints against and
investigations of judges.159 The state constitution’s removal clause authorizes
the governor to “remove any officer appointed by him unless otherwise pro-
vided by law,”160 and the statute was silent on removal.161 The challengers
argued that the legislature had implicitly limited the governor’s removal
power by setting fixed terms for the commissioners’ service and by making it
apparent that the Commission needed to be “independent from political in-
fluence.”162 The court rejected that argument, holding that “a limit on the
Governor’s removal power must be expressly stated.”163
157. Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Maryland have statutes offering a transsubstantive defini-
tion of an independent agency. See IOWA CODE §§ 7E.3–.4 (2017) (defining “independent
agency” as “an administrative unit which, because of its unique operations, does not fit into the
general pattern of operating departments,” but stating that the heads of departments and inde-
pendent agencies have the same duties); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 9A-101 (LexisNexis
2017) (defining “independent agency” as “an office, commission, board, department, or agency
established as an independent unit of government that may receive budgetary or administra-
tive support from the federal, State, or local government”); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103 (2018)
(one of several state statutes defining “independent agency” as “[b]oards, commissions and
other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth which are not subject to the policy supervi-
sion and control of the Governor”).
158. Sometimes what little explanation exists indicates further distance from the federal
paradigm of independence equaling insulation from the governor. See, e .g ., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-8-104 (2017) (establishing the Health Services Permit Agency as an independent agency
“under the supervision and control of the Governor”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:725 (2018) (stating
that the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness is “an inde-
pendent agency in the office of the governor” and that the director reports directly to the gov-
ernor).
159. 2003-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 1–3, 11, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197, 200, 205. The court ex-
plained that Governor Richardson, upon taking office, had been “removing executive officers,
state employees and board members and replacing them with his own appointees.” Espinosa,
2003-NMSC-017 at ¶ 3.
160 . Id . at ¶ 5 (quoting N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5).
161 . Id .at ¶ 6.
162 . Id . at ¶ 20, 23–24.
163 . Id . at ¶ 27.
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Yet in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v .
Martinez,164 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the governor lacked
authority to fire at will the members of the Public Employee Labor Relations
Board, reasoning that the governor’s removal would flout the statute’s pur-
pose of creating a “neutral and balanced” board165 and in turn would violate
the governor’s obligation to faithfully execute the laws.166 The court drew
several factual distinctions between the Board and the commission at issue in
Espinosa, including the nature of the appointment process and the Board’s
adjudicative functions (including in cases involving the governor).167 The
court thereby suggested that the governor’s removal power will depend on
case-specific, multifactor judgments about the legislature’s intent to divorce
the governor from the agency’s work. But the courts do not resolve these
cases by reasoning that the agency at issue is or is not an “independent agen-
cy.” As Section III.B will show, similarly noncategorical approaches domi-
nate on other questions, including the threshold for for-cause removals,168
the reviewability of removals,169 and the constitutionality of legislative ap-
pointment.170
There are a few noteworthy exceptions to this pattern. Some state courts
do discuss independent agencies as a category, but even they eschew clear
delineations of which agencies count as independent. Whereas the federal
courts generally infer independent status from the presence of tenure protec-
tion,171 the states in this group consider the totality of the circumstances.
Utah, for example, considers four nonexhaustive, nondispositive factors to
determine whether an agency is “subject to direct executive supervisory con-
trol”;172 Nebraska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have at times taken a simi-
lar tack in asking whether an agency is executive or independent for
164. 2011-NMSC-018, 150 N.M. 132, 257 P.3d 952.
165 . Martinez, 2011-NMSC-018 at ¶ 8–9.
166 . See id . at ¶ 5.The court also questioned whether the governor’s removal would vio-
late due process, particularly because the governor is often a party to dispute the board adjudi-
cates. Id . at 956.
167 . Id . at 957.
168 . See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Massachusetts case law).
169 . See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Oklahoma).
170 . See infra Section III.B.1.
171 . See supra Part I.
172. Beehive Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2004 UT 18, ¶ 21, 89 P.3d 131 (“In deter-
mining whether state agencies are subject to direct executive supervisory control we look to a
number of factors, including, but not limited to, whether the agency was established as an in-
dependent agency by the legislature, whether the agency is governed by a board or executive
officer, whether executive officials play a significant role in agency affairs, and whether the
agency receives state funding. No one factor is dispositive to our decision.” (citation omitted)).
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purposes of joint appointment rules, gubernatorial reorganization, and ter-
mination.173
Moreover, most state courts do not infer independence across the board
from the presence of one indicator of independence. This contrasts with the
federal court approach, which tends to assume that if the president cannot
fire an agency head, he also cannot control the agency head’s decisions.174
Often, as noted, hybrid independence is what the positive law commands, be
it through constitutions, statutes, or both. As the California Court of Appeals
explained in Brown v . Chiang, “while California’s executive branch is divided
in the sense that the officers are independently elected, and therefore cannot
be removed by the Governor, the Governor is charged [by statute] with su-
pervising the official conduct of these officers.”175 Indeed, Part III observes
that plenty of state officials with some form of tenure protection are subject
to gubernatorial supervision, and state courts generally bless this arrange-
ment.
B. Independence-Affecting Rulings
State courts’ noncategorical approach to agency independence compli-
cates the effort to study what independence means. However, as noted, some
evaluation is possible by considering patterns in state court rulings on three
core variables of independence: selection, supervision, and removal. This
Section offers highlights of state court approaches on each of these three sets
of questions. Taken together, they support the two main claims of this Part:
that state constitutional structure does not necessitate agency independence,
and that state court methodologies limit certainty about the legal status of
independence. In each of these three areas, state courts primarily engage in
focused, “clause-based” interpretation of their constitutions—which often
coincides with Thayerian deference to legislative discretion.176 In addition,
the rulings tend to be narrow and fact bound. Setting aside the normative
implications and institutional drivers of state courts’ methodologies, the case
law as a whole makes the result of any given case hard to predict in most
states and likely suppresses the emergence of norms regarding independ-
ence.
173 . See State ex rel . Johnson v. Chase, 25 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Neb. 1946) (joint appointment);
In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 559, 561 (N.J. 2013)
(reorganization); Arneson v. Wolf, 117 A.3d 374, 376 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (removal).
174 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 835 (describing and critiquing the implication
from Wiener v . United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), that “if an agency has a for-cause removal
protection provision, it can claim for itself additional protections to achieve that ‘absolute free-
dom’ from presidential control”).
175. 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 69 (Ct. App. 2011). Similarly, state courts have declined to infer
gubernatorial supervisory power from the presence of at-will removal power. See Whiley v.
Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011).
176 . See Schapiro, supra note 148, at 690–92 (linking state courts “highly deferential
standard” toward state legislation to the preferred approach of James Bradley Thayer, who ad-
vocated judicial deference to legislation).
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1. Selection Power
The creation of officials who are not selected by the governor is the most
distinctive feature of agency independence in the states. Independent selec-
tion powers are not unlimited and, critically, are often not paired with other
forms of independence, but separate selection still forms the high-water
mark of state agency independence.
Separate selection allows insulation from the chief executive in ways not
possible at the federal level. Nearly every state allows forms of independent
selection that the federal constitution does not.177 At the federal level, it is
familiar fare that the Appointments Clause prescribes the methods for select-
ing executive branch officials.178 Among other things, it bars legislative ap-
pointments,179 and it requires that all principal officers be selected by the
president with the Senate’s consent.180 These requirements ensure that, at the
highest levels of the federal government, the president gets to choose who
will serve. Of course, not all presidential nominees will be confirmed, but it
goes without saying that neither Congress nor the public can displace the
president and select a high-ranking executive branch official themselves.
Things look different at the state level. As noted in Part I, the majority of
state constitutions themselves establish direct popular election of some exec-
utive branch officials other than the governor. Perhaps less well known is
that the majority of state courts also bless schemes of legislative appoint-
ment.181 In some states, the constitution expressly prescribes legislative ap-
pointment of particular officials,182 or even an entire set of officials.183 In
most states, the language of appointments clauses is broad enough to allow
177 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A. My observations and analysis on state
court selection and appointment procedures within this section are drawn from the survey of
all fifty states’ constitutions presented in Appendix A.
178 . SeeU.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976).
179 . See, e .g ., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135–36 (“Con-
gress is precluded under the principle of separation of powers from vesting in itself the au-
thority to appoint those who will exercise such authority.”).
180 . See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; cf . Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)
(clarifying the definition of a principal officer).
181. For compatible findings, see 1 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3:21 (7th ed. 2010) (collecting cases from thirty-
five states); Devlin, supra note 19, at 1242–51; David R. Carpenter, Note, On the Separation of
Powers Challenge to the California Coastal Commission, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 286 n.16 (2004)
(updating Devlin’s collection).
182. For example, the Maine Constitution empowers its legislature to select the attorney
general, secretary of state, and treasurer. ME. CONST. art. IX, § 11; id . art. V, pt. 2, § 1; id . pt. 3,
§ 1. The Maryland Constitution authorizes its legislature to select the Treasurer, MD. CONST.
art. VI, § 1, and the Michigan Constitution directs the legislature to select the Auditor General,
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 53.
183. For example, the Louisiana Constitution authorizes the legislature to appoint the
members of boards and commissions; the governor appoints officials leading single-headed
agencies. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(H).
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for legislative appointments;184 for example, many such clauses state that of-
ficers’ selection will be as provided “by law” or that the governor’s appoint-
ment power is subject to legislative specification.185 Moreover, to the extent
these provisions are ambiguous about whether they permit legislative ap-
pointments (as opposed to mere legislative specification of qualifications or
appointment processes),186 state courts tend to invoke the principle that state
constitutions are limitations on, rather than grants of, legislative power.187
As noted, it is this feature of nongubernatorial selection that has gotten
the most attention in scholarship on state executive branches and generated
the conception of states as home to meaningful intraexecutive independence.
Yet even on this issue, the unpredictability of state independence appears.
For one, while appointment cases tend to be more straightforward and
transsubstantive than state cases on removal and supervision, state courts
have fostered some uncertainty. Most states that permit legislative appoint-
ments do not permit all legislative appointments.188 Instead, they subject leg-
islative appointments to functional, case-by-case separation of powers
analysis.189 In one prominent case, the California Supreme Court explained
that the applicable standard it found consistent with standards in other states
was “whether these provisions, viewed from a realistic and practical perspec-
tive, operate to defeat or materially impair the executive branch’s exercise of
its constitutional functions.”190 The court answered this question in the
negative by looking at the nature of the commission’s work, the nature of its
functions, and the relationship between the commission’s work and the gov-
ernor’s executive duties.191 This test is a bit like the U.S. Supreme Court’s
184 . See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1243 (explaining that state appointments clauses are
“generally phrased to permit a construction that would allow legislatures to determine both
how and by whom statutory administrative officials may be chosen”).
185 . See id . at 1238 n.117 (gathering examples).
186. Restrictions on appointee qualifications can also constrain the governor, as they do
the president at the federal level. Some of these constraints may be incidental effects of a sepa-
rate policy goal. For example, Iowa requires gender balance on certain boards and commis-
sions, IOWA CODE § 69.16A (2018), and Kentucky imposes racial ratios on certain boards, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.821 (LexisNexis 2017) (requiring that the governor’s appointees to
Board of Trustees of the University of Louisville reflect “[n]o less than the proportional repre-
sentation of the minority racial composition of the Commonwealth”). In other instances, legis-
latures may use qualifications to substantively stack the deck—ensuring, for example, that the
governor’s party will never have a majority, see Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 2018)
(rejecting such an attempt), or that appointees will likely have a particular point of view, see,
e .g ., Ky. Ass’n of Realtors v. Musselman, 817 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1991) (upholding statute limiting
governor’s appointments to state Real Estate Commission to agents chosen from a list created
by the Kentucky Association of Realtors).
187 . See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1244 & n.138.
188 . See id . at 1245–46, 1245 n.140.
189 . See id . at 1246.
190. Marine Forests Soc’y v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 113 P.3d 1062, 1087 (Cal. 2005).
191 . See id . at 1087–89.
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Morrison v . Olson approach to removal,192 though more arrangements seem
to flunk the state test than would flunkMorrison.193
More importantly, the broad and relatively straightforward power that
states confer on legislatures to participate in appointments of executive offi-
cials is not extended to independence from supervision and removal. The
next two subsections explain.
2. Removal
Removal—the classic indicator of independence under federal law—
exemplifies the mixed picture of state agency independence. On one hand,
state constitutions and decisional law are much more tolerant of removal re-
strictions than the federal Constitution. On the other, state legislatures have
not accepted the invitation to insulate every agency from the governor by
granting it tenure protection. And when they have, state courts have often
interpreted those restrictions in ways that favor the governor’s prerogative.
In doing so, state courts have not broken with the pattern of ordinary inter-
pretation described above. They have instead gone to the opposite extreme:
they have relied upon specific constitutional removal provisions, removal-
constraining statutes, and common-law presumptions about reviewability
without identifying any deeper value at issue. The resulting case law is par-
ticularly tangled.
To begin, the traditional view is that removal is not an inherent execu-
tive power in the states.194 Rather, the governor’s removal power is a matter
of positive law. Most state constitutions (roughly twenty-nine) have a
transsubstantive removal clause (or clauses).195 A few of these give the gov-
ernor substantial at-will removal power,196 but the majority of states (thirty-
five) authorize the legislature to set the parameters for removal, either be-
cause the removal clause says so or because the constitution does not address
192. 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (examining “whether the Act, taken as a whole, violates the
principle of separation of powers by unduly interfering with the role of the Executive Branch”).
193 . See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1246–47.
194 . See, e .g ., State ex rel . Ayers v. Kipp, 74 N.W. 440, 442 (S.D. 1898) (finding no implied
gubernatorial removal power preventing the legislature from enacting removal restrictions,
and collecting similar cases from other states); MATHEWS, supra note 119, at 98 (“The state
governor . . . is not considered as having any power of removal, either as a result of his general
executive power, or as an incident of his power of appointment. What power of removal the
governor has must . . . be derived from some specific provision of the constitution or stat-
utes.”).
195 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B.
196 . See, e .g ., ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. V, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. V,
§ 10; PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. Interestingly, Pennsylvania courts have read the constitutional at-
will removal provision in conjunction with the more legislatively driven appointments provi-
sion and determined that the legislature is permitted to create agencies with tenure protection.
See Arneson v. Wolf, 117 A.3d 374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
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removal.197 Thus, although cutting the governor out of the removal process
altogether would flatly violate some state constitutions, there is at least an
argument that many constitutions would allow the legislature to make every
agency tenure protected, and thus “independent” in the federal sense.
But, reinforcing the claim that constitutional possibility and reality are
distinct, state statutes generally have not slashed gubernatorial removal. In-
deed, as noted in Part I, a core element of the reform of most state executive
branches was to increase the number of agency officials the governor could
remove,198 and many state statutes affirmatively provide for broad guberna-
torial removal power, at least as a default.199 Still, every state legislature has
chosen to preserve for-cause removal status for some state agencies, boards,
and commissions. As to those, the question is whether and to what degree
the removal limitations constrain the governor.
At the federal level, courts and scholars widely view tenure protections,
like requirements that the president can only remove an officer “for cause,”
as a substantial limit on presidential removals. That view depends on two
premises that are widely true in federal court but ultimately optional. First,
federal courts generally understand removal restrictions like “for cause” to
impose a high bar, precluding termination for mere policy disagreements.200
Second, federal courts (apparently) stand ready to review presidential firings
197. In nine of the constitutions included in this tally, there is no mention of removal at
all, and the legislature has interpreted that silence as an invitation to fill the void. See, e .g .,
IDAHO CONST.; KY. CONST.; Hawley v. Bottolfsen, 98 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1940) (assessing gover-
nor’s evidence underlying removal); Johnson v. Laffoon, 77 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1934). In twenty-
five of the states that do include a removal clause, the constitution expressly authorizes the leg-
islature to set removal parameters. See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B.
198 . See, e .g ., FERREL HEADY, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE STRUCTURE OF
ADMINISTRATION 16 (1961) (noting “a trend to broaden the removal powers of the governor,”
but noting that states were “still far from” the Model State Constitution’s recommendation that
all department heads be appointed by and removable at will by the governor). For an example
of a state statute conferring broad removal powers on governors, see W. VA. CODE § 6-6-4
(2015), which gives the governor the discretion to remove any appointee at will.
199 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B.
200 . See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010)
(rejecting the possibility that “simple disagreement with the Board’s policies or priorities could
constitute ‘good cause’ for its removal”). This seems to be the prevailing wisdom, though as
scholars have noted, the Supreme Court has not consistently been clear about the standard. See
Aditya Bamzai & John F. Duffy, Is Barney Frank Right About the President’s Power to Remove
the CFPB Director?, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/is-barney-frank-right-about-the-presidents-power-to-remove-the-cfpb-
director-by-aditya-bamzai-john-f-duffy/ [https://perma.cc/W37P-PW4B]. For a recent con-
curring opinion suggesting a lower standard, at least in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
particular textual limits, see PHH Corp . v . Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F.3d 75,
124 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Griffith, J., concurring), which concluded that the Act’s limitation of re-
moval to instances of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” constitutes “only a
minimal restriction on the President’s removal power.”
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to ensure they complied with the relevant standard.201 The majority of state
courts part ways with the federal approach on one or both of these premises.
First, although state courts have widely divergent views on the meaning
of restrictions like “for cause” and “misconduct,” a few place the bar decid-
edly lower than at the federal level, and most have left the question un-
clear.202 For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld as
sufficient cause an official’s public disagreement with the governor,203 and
the New Jersey Supreme Court found “reasons of economy” to constitute
cause.204 Other cases seem, more subtly, to interpret conduct strictly against
the terminated official: if the conduct could be classified as inappropriate,
then it suffices for termination.205 Still other states have expressly stated that
the strenuousness of the removal standard will vary for each agency, depend-
ing on the nature of the office.206 Most commonly, state courts either lack
precedent elaborating the meaning of for-cause termination, or they rule
narrowly on the dispute before them without articulating what the standard
means.207
The second and perhaps more important way in which some state courts
have sheltered governors from limited removal power is through their ap-
proach to reviewability. Roughly half the states have case law stating that
removal decisions are unreviewable or reviewed with substantial defer-
ence.208 Those cases that declare removal unreviewable align with an early,
influential state treatise on public officers, which described the determina-
tion of “cause” as a matter of pure executive discretion.209 In states that ad-
201 . See Bamzai & Duffy, supra note 200.
202 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B.
203. Bennett v. Thomson, 363 A.2d 187, 188–91 (N.H. 1976); see also Daleo, supra note
132, at 438–39 (identifying additional cases).
204. Barringer v. Miele, 77 A.2d 895, 897 (N.J. 1951).
205. For example, a South Carolina case upheld the governor’s termination of an officer
for “misconduct” based on the officer’s delay in providing the governor information, reasoning
that a statute required public officers to “immediately furnish” requested information to the
governor. Rose v. Beasley, 489 S.E.2d 625, 627–28 (S.C. 1997) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-3-
10 (1986)).
206 . See Flomenbaum v. Commonwealth, 889 N.E.2d 423, 428 (Mass. 2008) (“[W]hat
constitutes sufficient cause to remove the head (or a member) of a governmental agency from
office is determined in the context of the authority of the particular agency to act as an inde-
pendent body.”).
207 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B.
208 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix C.
209. MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND SURETIES INOFFICIAL BONDS § 396, at 387 (1892) (“[T]he removing authority is
the sole and exclusive judge of the cause, and the sufficiency thereof; and . . . the courts cannot
review its decision in any case where it ha[s] jurisdiction.”). The other major state treatise on
the topic envisions a greater, but still somewhat deferential, role for judicial review. FLOYD R.
MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 450, at 285–86 (1890)
(“Where no particular cause is so specified, it must rest in the discretion of the executive, sub-
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here most closely to this understanding, the for-cause standard either be-
comes irrelevant 210 or reduces to a sort of magic-words exercise: the stand-
ard is met “whenever the governor is satisfied” that one of the listed causes
exists.211 Those that find removal subject only to light review generally state
that courts can ensure that the governor was acting within his jurisdiction
(that is, for one of the enumerated statutory causes) or root out arbitrariness,
but will not review the evidence supporting the governor’s decision.212 For a
further twist, in Oklahoma, the reviewability of a governor’s removal deci-
sion depends on whether the court believes the legislature intended the deci-
sion to be reviewable for the particular agency or official in question.213
Finally, a number of the states with precedents deeming removals unreview-
able also have cases that review removals on the merits, often without expla-
nation of the contradiction.214
Scholars of federal agency independence may observe that the result is
roughly the mirror image of the federal approach: Federal courts hold that
constitutional law limits agency independence215 but have arguably eroded
those limits through a series of statutory rules of thumb.216 In contrast, many
state courts, stuck with constitutions that plant seeds of independence, have
recognized its constitutional footing but narrowed it through subconstitu-
tional means.
3. Governors’ Supervisory Powers
The third leg of independence is the governor’s supervisory powers,
which include the ability to control agencies’ decisions or affairs. In broad-
strokes comparison at the federal level, the president must retain some con-
ject to the right of the courts to examine as to its existence, to determine what cause shall be
sufficient.” (footnote omitted)).
210 . See, e .g ., Keenan v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253, 264 (1859) (describing the governor as “the
sole judge of the causes” for removal).
211. State ex rel .McReavy v. Burke, 36 P. 281, 284 (Wash. 1894).
212 . See, e .g ., Taylor v. Lee, 226 P.2d 531, 540 (Utah 1951) (concluding that removal re-
view would only be for arbitrariness, and describing dual concerns of deterring governors from
inflicting “the possible ruination of the man removed” for arbitrary reasons, while also ensur-
ing executive efficiency “without interference by the judicial department”). The Taylor court
ultimately rejected the governor’s attempted removal in that case. See id . at 547.
213 . See, e .g ., Hall v. Tirey, 501 P.2d 496, 501 (Okla. 1972) (holding that “the Legislature
intended to create an independent administrative board free of the influence that a Governor
can assert” and therefore a removed member “is entitled to have the courts decide whether his
removal complied with the standards established by the Legislature”).
214 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix B. Compare, e .g ., Roberts v. Richardson,
2005-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 12–14, 137 N.M. 226, 109 P.3d 765, 767, with State ex rel . Ulrick v.
Sanchez, 255 P. 1077, 1077 (N.M. 1926).
215 . See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14
(2010); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
216 . See Bamzai & Duffy, supra note 200 (exploring these statutory rules in federal
court).
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stitutional minimum of supervisory power over agencies; above that mini-
mum, Congress may insulate agencies.217 Interestingly, there is little federal
precedent on supervision by itself, because the Supreme Court typically
treats removal and supervision as intertwined. It has doubted that anything
short of at-will removal power amounts to real supervision,218 while also as-
suming that, where removal power is limited, so is supervisory power.219
Turning to the states, does decisional law cement any constitutional ground
rules regarding supervision itself? Is there a core of gubernatorial superviso-
ry power that state legislatures cannot divest, or a core of agency independ-
ence that the governor (or legislature) cannot invade?
One caveat before proceeding is that, although state cases provide some
answers, there are far fewer state decisions on supervision than on appoint-
ment and removal,220 and few of the relevant cases resolve exactly the same
legal issue.221 Given the limited data points, this discussion offers a rough
sketch of paths state courts follow—first on disputes among constitutional
officers, and then on disputes between governors and legislative agencies—
rather than a precise tally of state positions.
Clashes Between Governors and Constitutional Officers . Supervision dis-
putes between governors and constitutional officers are unique in that both
sides can claim constitutional executive power. These cases—governor ver-
sus attorney general, or governor versus controller, for example—are those
in which the popular wisdom assumes complete agency independence. In
reality, these rulings are all over the map.
At least one case does fully follow the popular wisdom and illustrates its
underlying logic. In Brown v . Barkley, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected
a gubernatorial executive order that would have transferred power from the
217 . See supra Part I; Free Enter ., 561 U.S. at 501–02 (concluding that multi-level tenure
protection deprived the president of his constitutional “power to oversee executive officers”);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695–97 (1988) (concluding that the president’s role in ap-
pointing, supervising, and removing the independent counsel provided sufficient control).
218 . See Free Enter ., 561 U.S. at 500 (stating that the “bureaucratic minutiae” of oversight
authority does not substitute for removal power).
219 . See supra Part I; see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise,
124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1863 (2015) (remarking on the limited judicial development of the supervi-
sion concept).
220 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix A. I focus here on cases I take to be at the
heart of legal independence: rulings on whether the legislature (or governor) exceeded consti-
tutional bounds in limiting (or ignoring limits on) the governor’s constitutional power to
shape an agency’s decisions. Perhaps there are few supervision cases because most litigation
occurs around the more concrete events of appointment and removal—or perhaps it is because
state officials (sometimes) work things out without courts. See State ex rel . McGraw v. Burton,
569 S.E.2d 99, 114 n.21 (W. Va. 2002) (suggesting that “principles of accommodation, respect,
and comity among affected branches and officers of government have usually operated to re-
solve such issues without litigation”).
221 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix C.
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elected Commissioner of Agriculture to a governor-appointed agency.222 The
court found popular election to be evidence of independence: Because con-
stitutional officers like the Commissioner “are to be elected by the people . . .
they are not answerable to the supervision of anyone else.”223 The court
stressed that the governor lacks powers of “supervision and control” over
them and indicated that this arrangement served the valuable purpose of
“the diffusion of executive power.”224
The Kentucky court seems to stand alone, however, in deriving such a
categorical rule of independence. At the other end of the spectrum, several
cases take the opposite categorical position. In Tucker v . State, for example,
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected legislation that would have overhauled
the executive branch. In its opinion, the court underscored that the governor
alone wields the executive power—including the power to supervise other
executive officials—and that other elected constitutional officers, in contrast,
are merely “minor administrative officers.”225 A handful of cases in other
states similarly construe their constitutions to establish seemingly categorical
supervision by the governor over other constitutional officers.226
But most cases in my sample, twenty of the twenty-six cases involving
constitutional officers, forge a middle ground, reaching “clause-based”227 de-
cisions, or simply deferring to the legislature, without overarching conclu-
sions about agency independence or the governor’s supervisory power.228
Where the relevant constitutional clause vests the officer with a concrete
power, state courts hold that the legislature may not transfer that power to
the governor, and the governor may not claim it for himself.229 But because
most state constitutions qualify the power of separate constitutional officers
by bestowing only powers “provided by law” (the “minimalist approach” de-
scribed in Brown v . Chiang),230 these cases generally hinge on whatever the
legislature has stated.231 If the legislature attempts to deprive an officer of all
222. 628 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Ky. 1982). The governor based this order on his statutory re-
organization power. Brown, 628 S.W.2d at 619.
223 . Id . at 622–23.
224 . Id . at 622.
225. 35 N.E.2d 270, 291–93 (Ind. 1941).
226 . In re Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d 704, 718 (Ala. 2010);
Bronster v. United Pub. Workers, 975 P.2d 766, 772 (Haw. 1999); State ex rel . Hartley v.
Clausen, 264 P. 403, 405–06 (Wash. 1928).
227 . SeeManning, supra note 26.
228 . See Seifter, supra note 25, at Appendix C.
229 . See, e .g ., Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 28 P. 1125, 1127–28 (Colo. 1892)
(holding that where the constitution had delegated authority to a state board of land commis-
sioners, that authority was necessarily not part of the “supreme executive power . . . vested in
the governor”).
230. 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 69 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted).
231 . See, e .g ., Ahearn v. Bailey, 451 P.2d 30, 34 (Ariz. 1969) (noting that the state attorney
general’s constitutional powers are “as prescribed by law,” making them “wholly within the
control of the Legislative Department”).
1574 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1537
power, state courts identify the “core” or minimum power that the constitu-
tional establishment of the office requires.232 But where the legislature mere-
ly attempts incrementally to expand or contract an official’s power, these
cases are typically resolved by legislative text, without extensive constitution-
al analysis.233 Indeed, some cases expressly decline to theorize broadly given
the difficulty and sensitivity of the cases.234
Clashes Between Governors and Boards or Commissions . A second set of
cases involves disputes regarding the governor’s control over officials created
not by state constitutions, but by state legislatures. These disputes are closer
to the classic federal agency independence cases, like Humphrey’s Executor v .
United States235 and Free Enterprise Fund v . Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board,236 which likewise involve chief executive control of legisla-
tively established agencies. Because these state disputes do not involve any
competing constitutional powers of the agency, their resolution focuses on
whether the governor possesses an irreducible core of supervisory power that
the legislature cannot violate.
Again, some state cases reach broad rulings in favor of either independ-
ence or gubernatorial power, but most defer to the legislature. At least one
court has concluded that the governor has no implied supervisory power,
such that the legislature can deny the governor all control over an agency’s
decisions (subject to separate limits on appointment and removal).237 At the
232 . E .g ., State ex rel . Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. 1986) (stating
that the majority approach among states is to prevent legislatures from eliminating the “core
functions” of a constitutional office); State ex rel. McGraw v. Burton, 569 S.E.2d 99, 107 (W.
Va. 2002) (“[T]here are certain core functions of the Office of Attorney General that are inher-
ent in the office, of which the Office of Attorney General may not be deprived . . . .”); Powers v.
State, 2014 WY 15, ¶ 24, 318 P.3d 300, 308 (Wyo. 2014) (echoing this majority view).
233. Of course, deference to legislation that expands a constitutional officer’s power ef-
fectively upholds less than complete gubernatorial supervision. For one interesting departmen-
talist take on that issue, see Feeney v . Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1265–66 (Mass. 1977),
which states that if the legislature thought the attorney general’s power invaded the governor’s
“supreme” power, the legislature could revise the statute.
234 . See, e .g ., State ex rel . Stubbs v. Dawson, 119 P. 360, 364 (Kan. 1911) (“We are not
required to explore and delimit the frontiers of the supreme executive power . . . [or] to fore-
shadow . . . controversies which may never arise.”). For an intriguing case showing greater will-
ingness to engage the constitutional puzzle of the plural executive, see Perdue v . Baker, 586
S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2003). There, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the governor and
attorney general both possessed litigation authority—an allocation that “provides a system of
checks and balances within the executive branch”—before deferring to the legislature’s desig-
nation of the attorney general as the proper party to bring the suit at issue (regarding legislative
redistricting). See id . at 610, 614.
235. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
236. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
237 . See State ex rel . S. Monroe & Son Co. v. Baker, 147 N.E. 501, 504 (Ohio 1925) (“The
Governor’s authority is supreme in the sense that no other executive authority is higher or au-
thorized to control his discretion, where discretion is lodged in him, and yet it is not supreme
in the sense that he may dominate the course and dictate the action and control the discretion
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other extreme, a few cases take the approach of the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Cooper v . Berger,238 concluding that the constitu-
tion mandates that the governor retain some minimum degree of control
over the state’s executive branch—in that case, the ability to “hav[e] ‘the final
say’ ” on the decisions of the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics
Enforcement.239
But, as with the constitutional disputes, most clashes between governors
and legislative agencies take no categorical constitutional position. Most
simply defer to the legislature. In some cases, the courts do not even mention
the possibility that the legislation might go too far in the direction of either
independence or supervision.240 In others, state courts have indicated that
some line exists but have not identified it. The leading case from Alabama,
for example, seemed to make the matter one of pleading: because the gover-
nor had not shown himself to be totally powerless, and had not articulated a
workable standard for the limits of his power, he could not succeed on a
claim that he’d been denied sufficient authority over a particular state com-
mission.241
As with the clashes among constitutional officers, the disputes involving
gubernatorial control over boards and commissions sow unpredictability—
either because they allow the legislature carte blanche to define supervision,
or because they impose limits on the legislature but decline to develop those
limits beyond the contours of the case under review.
* * *
of other executive officers . . . acting within the scope of the powers, duties, and authorities
conferred upon them respectively.”).
238. 809 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 2018).
239 . Cooper, 809 S.E.2d at 114. Cooper disavows the creation of a rule and states that all
decisions about gubernatorial supervision must be made case by case, id . at 111, but, as the dis-
sent suggests, the majority’s reasoning seems to require that the governor be able to hold a ma-
jority of appointments to every multimember board, id . at 117–19 (Martin, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Federal Election Commission would be unconstitutional under the majority’s
analysis). For other cases giving gubernatorial supervision a categorical constitutional case, see
State ex rel . McCrory v . Berger, 781 S.E.2d 248, 258 (N.C. 2016), and Kenny v . Byrne, 365 A.2d
211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), which states that the governor “has the duty and power to
supervise all employees in each principal department,” id . at 215–16. Notably, however, New
Jersey courts have upheld statutes that limit gubernatorial supervision by placing agencies “in,
but not of” the executive branch. See In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable
Hous., 70 A.3d 559 (N.J. 2013).
240 . See, e .g ., Edwards v. Bd. of Trs. of the State Emps. Grp. Benefits Program, 94-0674
(La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94); 644 So. 2d 776 (upholding governor’s inspection of tenure-protected
agency as consistent with governor’s statutory budget authority); Chang v. Univ. of R.I., 375
A.2d 925, 929 (R.I. 1977) (rejecting governor’s attempted control of university employment
practices where legislature delegated that responsibility to the state’s Board of Regents).
241. State ex rel . King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. 2006).
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In addition to the significance of the selection, supervision, and removal
doctrines individually, it is noteworthy that the absence of a categorical ap-
proach to independence has led many courts to embrace divergent rules re-
lated to each of the three drivers of independence. A state may generously
allow legislative appointments, but then require strong gubernatorial super-
vision.242 Or a state may make it very easy for governors to remove officers,
but difficult to supervise them.243 Or state law may provide for expansive gu-
bernatorial supervision, but limited removal power.244
All told, as interpreted by state courts, the plural executive structure it-
self does not require strongly independent state executive branches. Rather,
the plural executive structure establishes the possibility of strong independ-
ence. The decisional rules and methodologies described above do not em-
brace that independence to its fullest extent; nor do they cement strong
gubernatorial control. Both because state constitutions so often leave inde-
pendence to legislative construction, and because state courts eschew cate-
gorical pronouncements on independence, the result—de facto even when
not de jure—is independence that is heavily contingent on the political pro-
cess.
IV. STATEAGENCY INDEPENDENCEOUTSIDE THECOURTS
This Part considers the arenas in which most decisions affecting state
agency independence occur: the legislature and the broader realm of politics.
Section IV.A describes the instability of agency independence, noting how
frequently and readily states alter the insulation of particular entities. Section
IV.B highlights state legislative creativity, surveying some of the novel ways
that state legislatures create, combine, and separate vectors of independence.
242. For example, consider the pairing of Marine Forests Society v . California Coastal
Commission, 113 P.3d 1062, 1088 (Cal. 2005), which allowed legislative appointment of official
performing executive functions, and People ex rel . Deukmejian v . Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1209
(Cal. 1981), which emphasized the governor’s “supreme executive power” in the context of
supervision. Another state with internal tensions on these questions is New Jersey, which is
often known for its constitutional amendments that “created a very strong, probably the
strongest, governor,” ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION 127–28
(2d ed. 2012), but which has allowed the creation of independent agencies (despite seemingly
contrary constitutional text) and limited the governor’s supervision of them, see Council on
Affordable Hous ., 70 A.3d at 561–62; N.J. Exec. Comm’n on Ethical Standards v. Byrne, 569
A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
243. Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 713–15 (Fla. 2011) (stating that “the power to remove
is not analogous to the power to control”). This decision rested on state statutes, however,
which the legislature amended in the governor’s favor in the wake of the decision. See Travis L.
Miller, Coming Full Circle: Florida Legislature Sides with Governor in Affirming Executive
Branch Control over Rulemaking, FED’N REG. COUNSEL (2012), http://www.forc.org/Public/
Journals/2012/Articles/Summer/Vol23Ed2Article3.aspx [https://perma.cc/E3J6-DRJK].
244 . Compare State ex rel . Stubbs v. Dawson, 119 P. 360, 363 (Kan. 1911) (suggesting that
the Kansas constitution gives the governor broad authority to “secure an efficient execution of
the laws,” though linking its ultimate holding to a statute), with Barrett v. Duff, 217 P. 918
(Kan. 1923) (narrowly construing the Kansas governor’s removal power).
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Section IV.C theorizes how the combination of variation and instability,
combined with other factors in the state legal realm, make agency independ-
ence a weak norm.
A. Instability
The malleability of state institutions, and the rate at which state legisla-
tures alter the structure of government bodies, warrants a study of its own.245
Here I want to flag just one tentative observation: states appear to restructure
agencies more frequently than the federal government, and without the con-
troversy one would expect if the federal government attempted similar
changes.246
Consider first some examples of state legislatures tinkering with inde-
pendence in the past couple of years alone. Several states have proposed or
enacted legislation altering the powers of their attorneys general or other
elected officials.247 For example, after the election of a Republican governor,
Maryland’s Democratic legislature empowered its Democratic attorney gen-
eral;248 North Carolina’s Republican legislature, in contrast, decreased the
power of its Democratic attorney general and empowered its Republican su-
perintendent of public instruction.249 A number of states have taken steps to
revise the structure or powers of their appointed boards and commissions.250
245. I plan to pursue this question in future work. See Miriam Seifter, Professor, Univ. of
Wis., Federalism and the Role of State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Remarks at the UCLA
Law Review Symposium 1:10:49–2:21:30 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://uclalaw.hosted.panopto.com/
Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=3d86acb9-08f2-4ab9-a9f9-a86b0132dcc9 (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
246. For discussion of the federal baseline, see supra Part I.
247. For examples beyond those in the text, see S.B. 2268, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018)
(proposing to expand the attorney general’s authority over labor and employment matters);
Brad McElhinny, House Moving Bill to Rein in How Attorney General May Use Lawsuit Settle-
ment Funds, METRONEWS (Jan. 15, 2018, 5:35 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/01/15/
house-moving-bill-to-rein-in-how-attorney-general-may-use-lawsuit-settlement-funds/
[https://perma.cc/BVH3-YTHN]; Shira Schoenberg, Bills Would Strip Attorney General Maura
Healey’s Authority to Regulate ‘Copycat’ Assault Weapons, MASSLIVE (Nov. 16, 2017, 5:34 PM),
https://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/11/bills_would_strip_attorney_gen.html
[https://perma.cc/D2EL-CL8M]; and Deborah Yetter, Andy Beshear Livid After Bill Introduced
to Strip Attorney General’s Powers, COURIER J. (Mar. 8, 2017, 9:34 AM), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/08/andy-beshear-livid-after-bill-introduced-strip-
attorney-generals-powers/98881818/ [https://perma.cc/6Q2F-Q8ZS].
248. Duncan, supra note 34.
249 . See Anne Blythe & Craig Jarvis, NC Lawmakers Attempt to Clip Gov . Cooper’s Wings
Further in Budget, NEWS&OBSERVER (June 21, 2017, 6:38 PM), https://www.news
observer.com/news/politics-government/article157473739.html [https://perma.cc/2K3J-LJBQ].
250 . See Andrew Brown, Lawmakers in S .C . House to Vote on Some Nuclear-Related Bills,
but Wait on the Most Controversial, POST & COURIER (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/lawmakers-in-s-c-house-to-vote-on-some-nuclear/
article_bb4d2182-ff97-11e7-95f9-0bb49c99d5fc.html [https://perma.cc/637N-6YQP] (describ-
ing legislation proposing to alter the structure and increase oversight of the state Public Service
Commission in the wake of failed nuclear projects); Margaret Reist, Senator Wants to Elimi-
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Many of these changes affect the governor’s power, some indirectly and
some directly; in one pending example, a new ballot measure in Arizona
would subject the state’s Clean Election Commission to gubernatorial over-
sight.251 Still other states have targeted their governor in particular and seek
to limit gubernatorial power in selecting, supervising, or removing other of-
ficials.252
These examples are recent anecdotes, but state legislatures engaging in
executive branch restructuring dates back much further. In many of the cas-
es reviewed for this Article, the court’s description of the agency revealed
multiple changes to the agency’s structure since its initial creation.253 Indeed,
historical studies of state executive branches illuminate a long history of in-
nate Nebraska Board of Education, Give Control to Governor, LINCOLN J. STAR (Jan. 20, 2018),
http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/senator-wants-to-eliminate-nebraska-
board-of-education-give-control/article_c312c1b4-0365-589b-8abd-042d09b010cb.html
[https://perma.cc/7A8T-F74Y]; Mark Sommerhauser, Scott Walker Signs Bills Dismantling
GAB, Overhauling Campaign Finance Law, WIS. ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://
host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/scott-walker-signs-bills-dismantling-gab-
overhauling-campaign-finance-law/article_1b7a6063-8e98-514b-bceb-269f21f44574.html
[https://perma.cc/29T4-TKU4]; Alan Suderman, Northam Voices ‘Significant Concerns’ on
Electric Rate Bills, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.richmond.com/
news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/northam-voices-significant-concerns-
on-electric-rate-bills/article_bf0722c8-20b2-5b8f-9e28-c5ddd8191bfa.html [https://perma.cc/
6TJZ-ZNVP] (noting 2015 legislation that limited the power of Virginia’s State Corporation
Commission over electric utilities rates); JoAnne Young, Bills Would Seek to Solve Recent Ne-
braska State Patrol Officer Accountability Problems, LINCOLN J. STAR (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://journalstar.com/legislature/bills-would-seek-to-solve-recent-nebraska-state-patrol-
officer/article_8c70d8cf-ec86-5be7-87ee-8086a7aa868f.html [https://perma.cc/B4YC-P39S]
(describing legislation proposing to expand the powers of the Nebraska Crime Commission
over investigations of State Patrol officers and to limit the attorney general’s obligation to de-
fend such officers).
251. The new ballot measure, HCR 2007, would require any changes to the Commis-
sion’s rules to be approved by the Governor’s Regulatory Review Council, a body made up of
six members appointed by the governor. See Letter from Thomas M. Collins, Exec. Dir., Ariz.
Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, to Members and Staff of Ariz. Legislative Council (June 27,
2018), https://storageccec.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/public/docs/293-clean-elex-ed-ltr-to-
leg--cnl-.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D4X-ZH7Z].
252 . See Blythe, supra note 35. After Cooper prevailed in court, the legislature proposed a
constitutional amendment to solidify that the legislature controls “the powers, duties, respon-
sibilities, appointments, and terms of office” of all boards and commissions it creates. Act of
June 28, 2018, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 117, § 6; see also Meaghan Kilroy, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit
Questioning Kentucky Governor’s Ability to Restructure Pension Fund Board, PENSIONS& INVS.
(Jan. 9, 2018, 4:00 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20180109/ONLINE/180109829/
judge-dismisses-lawsuit-questioning-kentucky-governors-ability-to-restructure-pension-fund-
board [https://perma.cc/9L4D-3U4L].
253 . See, e .g ., State v. Falcon, 152 A.3d 687 (Md. 2017) (describing restructuring of the
public service commission); Thompson v. Craney, 546 N.W.2d 123, 138–39 n.6 (Wis. 1996)
(Wilcox, J., concurring) (chronicling the legislature’s repeated restructuring of the state’s edu-
cation board); see also Commission History, supra note 73 (describing approximately twenty
major reorganizations in the history of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, including
several switches from independent to executive status); supra notes 120–121 and accompany-
ing text (describing serial restructuring of constitutional agencies in Alabama and Virginia).
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cremental tinkering,254 as well as a broader spirit of experimentation with
institutions of government.255 And, on the whole, state legislatures seem to
be more productive and less gridlocked than Congress, making legislative
preference more likely to become legislative reality.256
This is not to say that legislatures are micromanaging state agencies and
altering their structure at any misstep. That is almost certainly not the case.
Most state legislatures are still part-time,257 and their agency oversight is not
as frequent or attentive as congressional oversight of federal agencies.258 A
more apt depiction is that, when state legislators do attend to problems in
the state executive branch, they are more willing and able than Congress to
respond with structural changes to the office itself.259 Arguably, such contin-
gent independence makes state agencies less independent of the legislature,
whatever their relationship with the governor.
Why might state legislatures act in this way? As an initial matter, it is
apparent why legislatures would pursue institutional design in the first in-
254 . See Berkman & Reenock, supra note 140.
255 . See WILLIAMS, supra note 146; John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State
Constitution-Making in the Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933, 937 (1999) (relaying that
“state [constitutional] conventions have served as forums for confronting, and occasionally
revising, principles and institutions of governance that have gone largely uncontested at the
national level”).
256 . See PEVERILL SQUIRE & KEITH E. HAMM, 101 CHAMBERS 117 (2005); Liz Essley
Whyte & Ben Wieder, Amid Federal Gridlock, Lobbying Rises in the States, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Feb. 11, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/02/11/19279/amid-
federal-gridlock-lobbying-rises-states [https://perma.cc/Y2ZG-S39Q] (stating that in 2013–
2014, Congress passed 352 bills, whereas states passed 45,000). There are complications to any
effort to measure and compare productivity. For one, what to make of the single subject rule in
many states? See James R. Rogers, The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Produc-
tion, 123 PUB. CHOICE 217, 224 & n.11 (2005) (deeming the rule’s effect “indeterminate”: it
might spur the splitting of omnibus legislation, but, by diminishing log rolling, might also de-
crease legislatures’ incentives to work on legislation as opposed to constituent services). State
legislation may be in some ways easier to enact; for example, most states have no filibuster. See
SQUIRE&HAMM, supra at 122–23. But state constitutions also regulate legislative procedure in
ways that the federal Constitution does not. SeeWILLIAMS, supra note 146, at 258, 281. The net
effect of those restrictions is unclear. See id . (contending that legislatures often ignore them).
257 . See Seifter, supra note 17, at 519 n.250 (describing compilation of data on which leg-
islatures are part-time).
258 . See, e .g ., Marjorie Sarbaugh-Thompson et al., Legislators and Administrators: Com-
plex Relationships Complicated by Term Limits, 35 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 57, 60, 81 (2010) (finding,
based on their own study of the Michigan legislature and of the limited existing literature, that
oversight of state agencies was a “low priority” for state legislatures and that state legislators
who have undertaken oversight have struggled to monitor agencies effectively); Neal D. Woods
& Michael Baranowski, Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies: The Effects
of Resources and Careerism, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 585, 585–87, 601 (2006) (noting weak legisla-
tive control over state agency policy as an impetus behind the legislative professionalization
movement, but observing that professionalization has decreased legislative incentives to en-
gage in oversight).
259 . Cf . Levinson, supra note 33, at 663, 692–97 (exploring why, at least at the federal
level, “processes and structures of political decisionmaking” are “more stable and enduring”
than substantive policies).
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stance: scholars have long recognized that structure can affect policy out-
comes.260 Legislatures’ specific motivations for altering independence may
vary. As the discussion above suggests, some of these state changes have oc-
curred on party lines in the wake of an election. Such changes suggest a de-
sire to demote one’s political opponents wholesale rather than fighting issue-
by-issue over policy.261 These changes roughly parallel the conventional view
that Congress creates federal independent agencies “to limit presidential
control” when the president is of the opposite party.262
In other instances, the state-level changes have seemed less partisan, and
instead have responded to an agency scandal or publicly disfavored decision.
Examples include attempts to reorganize state public utilities after unpopular
decisions that led to higher consumer bills,263 and the Massachusetts legisla-
ture restructuring the city of Boston’s transportation authority after a winter
of repeated transit shutdowns.264 In these cases, subjecting an independent
entity to greater political oversight seems to be an effort to create greater po-
litical accountability and greater congruence between agency actions and
public preferences. The opposite pattern can also occur: increasing an agen-
cy’s independence after it has appeared too beholden to politics or particular
politicians.
Given the benefits of ongoing legislative adjustments to agency inde-
pendence, the real question may be why federal choices regarding agency in-
dependence become sticky once the agency is created, while state legislatures
continue to tinker with independence. A complete answer to that question
must await future work.265 Surely, some analysis of transaction costs is part
260 . See generally Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Poli-
cy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444
(1989) (explaining how Congress may use agency procedures and structures to enhance con-
gressional control and “stack the deck” in favor of preferred groups).
261 . See Blythe, supra note 35 (North Carolina changes); Duncan, supra note 34 (Mary-
land changes).
262. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2008). But see Corrigan & Revesz,
supra note 64 (rejecting this view and identifying other variables, including presidential ap-
proval ratings, the size of the Senate’s majority and its alignment with the president, and the
role of entrepreneurs).
263 . See Brown, supra note 250 (South Carolina changes); Suderman, supra note 250
(Virginia changes).
264 . See CTR. FOR LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATIVE POLICYMAKING IN AN AGE OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 8
(2017).
265 . See Seifter, supra note 17, at 513 n.213. Clues may lie in Daryl Levinson’s framework
for addressing the puzzle of why institutional “rules of the game” are ever more stable than
substantive rights. See Levinson, supra note 33. If, as Levinson persuades, institutional stability
generally arises because the benefits of coordination exceed the costs of the constraint at issue,
id . at 712, 730–31, we should ask whether and why those costs and benefits differ in the state
context. If, to take some examples, state officials have a shorter-term view (are not repeat play-
ers), or if the costs of change are low (because few interest groups have invested substantially in
the status quo), leaving the rules of the game up for grabs may be rational.
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of the picture.266 Another partial answer may come from the norms sur-
rounding independence, which, as the rest of this Part will explore, are
weaker in the states.
B. Legislative Creativity
The long leash the state courts offer, and the absence of any predeter-
mined notion of independence, has led to a wide variety of legislative crea-
tions and a spectrum of independence.267 I focus here on a few intriguing
species: legislative combinations unfamiliar at the federal level.
First, legislatures combine tenure protection with gubernatorial supervi-
sion or directive authority. Whereas at the federal level tenure-protected
agencies are presumed to be immune from presidential control, state legisla-
tures routinely involve governors in the decisionmaking processes of tenure-
protected agencies. To take a few of the many examples, the Arizona gover-
nor can only remove members of the Arizona Game and Fish Commission
for “inefficiency, conflict of interest, neglect of duty or misconduct in of-
fice,”268 yet the governor must approve many of the Commission’s substan-
tive decisions.269 The Arkansas governor can only remove members of the
State Board of Health for good cause, but the governor directs important as-
pects of the Board’s work.270 The Massachusetts governor can only remove
members of the state’s Port Authority for cause, but the governor must ap-
prove any Port Authority construction or project.271 The Missouri governor
can only remove members of the Clean Water Board for cause, but the gov-
ernor can approve or alter water plans and designate areas for special atten-
tion.272 (There are also plenty of examples of governors taking part in
decisions of tenure-protected agencies even when statutes do not expressly
give them a role.)273
266 . See O’Connell, supra note 47, at 893–94 (discussing positive theories of why agen-
cies are restructured, and noting that “there are considerable transaction costs attached to
changing the structure of an existing agency”).
267. For an argument that Congress has also created a spectrum at the federal level—
albeit one that federal courts have not fully honored—see Datla & Revesz, supra note 12.
268. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-202(B) (2015).
269 . See id . §§ 17-202(A), -232, -241, -242, -621(B)(5) (2015).
270 . See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-102, -110, -113 (Supp. 2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-
16-804 (2014).
271 . SeeMASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 91 App., §§ 1-2, 1-4 (West 2018).
272 . SeeMO. REV. STAT. §§ 644.021, 644.141 (2016).
273. For example, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson recently “sent a letter to Ted
Thomas, chairman of the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC), directing the commis-
sion to work with utilities to ‘as expeditiously as possible’ take the necessary steps to pass on
the benefits of the recently passed corporate tax cut to Arkansas ratepayers.” Press Release,
Governor Hutchinson Applauds Entergy Arkansas’s Plan to Pass Tax Savings on to Customers
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://governor.arkansas.gov/press-releases/detail/governor-hutchinson-
applauds-entergy-arkansass-plan-to-pass-tax-savings-on [https://perma.cc/E6AF-RGS7].
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Second, state legislatures also routinely impose gubernatorial supervi-
sion on elected executive officials. It certainly would stand to reason that, as
some scholars have stated, “[b]ecause these officials are neither appointed by
the governor nor (more importantly) removable by her, the governor has lit-
tle or no formal influence over how these officials perform their constitu-
tionally assigned duties.”274 Or that “[i]ndependent election by the people
gives those elected state executive officials far greater autonomy, and far
greater control over their departments, than any federal official enjoys.”275
But in fact, in most states, the governor has directive or other authority
over some elected (or legislatively appointed) official’s work. Roughly a doz-
en states, like California, have a blanket statute charging the governor with
supervision of the work of all executive branch officials, without excluding
those who are elected.276 Still more states specify the governor’s role in shap-
ing the decisions of specific agencies or officials that are separately selected.
Consider the state attorneys general, whose stars have been rising in recent
years.277 Many states allow the governor to direct the work of the attorney
general in some way—either to direct the attorney general to file lawsuits, or
to prevent the attorney general from filing suit without gubernatorial ap-
proval.278 There are also some states in which constitutional officials can be
removed by the governor,279 and more in which the question is unclear.280 In
contrast, some states have precedent confirming the more intuitive notion
that elected officials can only be impeached.281
Third, whereas the presence of multiple members of a federal agency’s
leadership is typically associated with independence (although not immuta-
bly so), multi-memberness does not indicate either tenure protection or in-
dependence in the states. As just noted, there are commissions with tenure
protection that lack operational separation from the governor; most of those
274. Williams, supra note 18, at 573–74; see also Berry & Gersen, supra note 18, at 1404.
275. Devlin, supra note 19, at 1228 n.80.
276 . See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-101(A)(1) (2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12010 (West
2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 26-34(d) (2009); IDAHO CODE § 67-802(1) (2014); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV’T § 3-302 (LexisNexis 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-1-5(d) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 147-12(a)(1) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-07-01(1) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-7-1(1)
(2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-1-1(1) (LexisNexis 2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.010(1)
(2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-201 (2017).
277 . See generally NOLETTE, supra note 2 (detailing the increasing power of state attor-
neys general to shape national policy); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-
Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43 (2018).
278. For examples of state statutes allowing the governor to direct the attorney general to
file suit, see GA. CODE ANN. § 45-15-35 (2016); IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(b) (2017); and MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 14.28 (1979). For examples of states allowing the governor to block all or cer-
tain types of attorney general lawsuits, see 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 732-204(e)
(West 2012) (consent decrees), and In re Riley v. Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 57 So. 3d
704, 718–22 (Ala. 2010).
279 . SeeMD. CONST. art. II, § 22 (Secretary of State); MICH. CONST. art. V, § 10.
280 . See, e .g ., Daleo, supra note 132, at 435–39.
281 . See State ex inf .Nixon v. Moriarty, 893 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. 1995).
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are multimember entities.282 There are also multimember commissions re-
movable at the governor’s pleasure.283
Again, the varied ways in which state agencies can be partly independent
(but not wholly independent) goes a long way toward explaining why state
agency independence is neither a clear concept nor a strong norm.
C. Weak Norms
This Part has argued so far that agency independence in the states is un-
stable, because state legislatures continue to revisit institutional structure,
and variegated, because state legislatures create species of independence that
are unfamiliar on the federal scene. A third feature of agency independence
outside the courts is that it does not seem to be governed by a strong norm.
Scholars have offered varying definitions of norms, but all involve a felt
obligation to comply with rules that are not legally required.284 Norms are
closely related to “conventions,” which involve “(1) regular patterns of polit-
ical behavior (2) followed from a sense of obligation.”285 As Daphna Renan
and Adrian Vermeule have recently observed, norms (or conventions) play
an important role in defining (both expanding and contracting) presidential
power.286 Of prime relevance to this Article, norms have helped shape the
rules that relevant legal actors perceive regarding federal agency independ-
ence.287
But norms require certain predicates to form and persist, and these tend
to be missing at the state level. One such predicate, as just noted, is a con-
sistent pattern of behavior. As Vermeule explains, “there is no convention if
the relevant patterns of political behavior are ill-defined or fluctuating.”288
Where “the behavior of political institutions and actors in the public sphere
amounts to a random walk, in which circumstantial contingencies drive be-
havior and no well-settled norm of any kind can be observed . . . . the lens of
convention has no purchase.”289 This more or less describes state agency in-
dependence. It may not be a “random walk,” but the instability of institu-
tional forms, unpredictability of judicial rulings, and degree of legislatively
driven variation between agencies stifle the emergence of a pattern of behav-
ior.
282 . See supra text accompanying notes 268–272.
283 . See, e .g ., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.059(4) (West 2013) (creating an at-will default); PA.
CONST. art. VI, § 7 (same).
284 . See, e .g ., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 378 (1997); Renan, supra note 7.
285. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1185.
286 . See Renan, supra note 7, at 2189 (arguing that norms “provide the infrastructure
that any particular President inhabits” and that they “both augment[] and constrain[]” presi-
dential power); Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1198.
287 . See Renan, supra note 7, at 2227; Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1175–81.
288. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1185.
289 . Id .
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Moreover, the state-government ecosystem may suppress the emergence
of a norm regarding independence. Scholars of legal norms and conventions
have observed that both the formation and the persistence of norms require
a relevant legal community that will detect and react to compliance or devia-
tions.290 Renan emphasizes the importance of pluralistic institutional
checks,291 including intraexecutive actors like the Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) and other “legal elites” trained on the scope of executive power,292
as well as the press and civil society groups who respond to media cover-
age.293 But who will notice, or mind, if the governor, legislature, or agency
official exceeds the proper boundaries of state agency independence? States,
to my knowledge, generally do not have the equivalent of the OLC. More
broadly, even if a roughly similar institution exists, there is no “cult of the
[state] constitution,”294 especially on structural matters—no office or com-
munity whose focus is the state separation of powers. Nor do state-level me-
dia outlets or civil society groups pay significant attention to questions of
executive power.295
V. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF STATEAGENCY INDEPENDENCE
The picture of state agency independence created so far—one that is un-
stable, context specific, and seldom backed by a strong norm—creates ad-
vantages and disadvantages. This Part explores them. This discussion is
intended as an assessment of the state approach to independence, but it also
has federal significance. For one, commentators who decry the recent ero-
sion of certain federal agency independence norms should observe that such
erosion essentially moves the federal model closer to the state model. That
move, if effectuated, may well have costs, but it may also provide benefits
discussed here—or at least is unlikely to bring the sky crashing down. On the
flip side, scholars across the spectrum who critique the federal court practice
of abstracting independence and treating it as a binary may find of interest
that a move to more contextualized independence might have costs as well as
benefits.
290 . See, e .g ., Renan, supra note 7, at 2204–06 (discussing the importance of “the presi-
dency’s institutional surrounding”: “norms of presidential behavior will be more salient to elite
political, professional, and social networks than to most voters most of the time”); Vermeule,
supra note 11, at 1174–75 (stating that it is “[t]he communities that operate the administrative
state—executive and legislative officials, agency personnel, the administrative law bar, com-
mentators on administrative law, and regulated parties”—who “create and follow observable
norms of agency independence”); see also McAdams, supra note 284, at 358 (discussing the
importance of risk detection—and the awareness of “the relevant population” of that risk—to
norm formation).
291 . See Renan, supra note 7, at 2210.
292 . Id . at 2219–20, 2229.
293 . Id . at 2215.
294. TARR, supra note 79, at 31.
295 . See Seifter, supra note 43.
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A. Tailoring: Accuracy and Uncertainty
The state approach to independence is bespoke: state legislatures have
employed creative combinations of mechanisms to effectuate different de-
grees of independence. State courts, for their part, have honored those legis-
lative choices, departing from the federal assumption that independent
agencies fit a standard mold. On the whole, the tailored state approach por-
tends the benefit of accuracy both as an interpretive matter and as a matter
of institutional design. But, at least as currently practiced by state courts, it
also yields significant uncertainty about what the law requires.
Consider first how the state approach yields benefits as a matter of insti-
tutional design: A tailored approach to independence may produce greater
accuracy. That is, because state requirements are “agency-specific,” they may
be a better fit for the official or agency in question.296 The “fit” of independ-
ence is arguably important, because not all agencies work best with the same
degree of independence. For example, when scholars explain the need for
agency independence, they often begin with the Federal Reserve: of course,
the argument goes, it does not make sense to leave monetary policy vulnera-
ble to political whim.297 In contrast, the need for insulation is less obvious
when it comes to, say, the Federal Communications Commission. By adjust-
ing the degree and form of independence to the agency at issue, perhaps
states achieve a particularly good fit.
The state choice to grant tenure protection to some agencies while sub-
jecting them to some gubernatorial supervision might exemplify this sort of
well-tailored design. Perhaps we do not want a governor to fire the state’s
attorney general without a very good reason, but we still can identify sensi-
tive contexts in which the governor ought to play a supervisory role in the
attorney general’s work. Many state legislatures appear to believe that im-
portant litigation decisions are in this category.298 Again, by tailoring the
modes of independence to the office and issue, states may produce a better
fit.
State courts uphold the benefits of tailoring by recognizing it rather than
overlooking it—and in so doing, they avoid some alleged pitfalls of the deci-
sional law of federal agency independence. Scholars across the ideological
spectrum have criticized federal courts’ categorical approach to agency inde-
pendence. Kirti Datla and Richard Revesz have criticized federal courts for
obscuring “the diversity of agency form,” misconstruing congressional pur-
pose, and creating a categorical doctrine of agency independence where
296. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499, 576 (2011) (“[B]ecause each agency is unique—and derives its authority from unique stat-
utory provisions with disparate goals and means for achieving them—optimization of adminis-
trative law doctrine may require tailoring to particular circumstances.”).
297 . See, e .g ., Bressman & Thompson, supra note 58, at 602.
298 . See supra note 278.
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none exists.299 John Manning has argued, similarly, that there is no free-
floating constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.300 These need-
less abstractions arguably distract from what the positive law really re-
quires.301 Manning has urged that courts should instead apply the relevant
constitutional clauses as written, prohibiting only what the text of those
clauses, fairly construed, prohibits.302
If that sort of interpretive precision is a virtue, then scholars should be
pleased with the narrowness and (for the most part) discipline of state
courts. One could go further: the focused, clause-based approach of most
state courts on questions of independence is a partial rebuttal to the numer-
ous articles criticizing state courts for their miserable constitutional juris-
prudence.303 To the extent the critics’ claim is that state courts are not trying
to develop a distinctive jurisprudence of state constitutional law, those
claims seem misplaced on questions of independence. And if part of the de-
sign of state constitutions is to limit the power of the judicial branch, and not
just the legislative and executive branches,304 then the state courts’ choice of
agency-specific precedents over universal pronouncements seems particular-
ly appropriate.
That said, state legislatures and decisional law have arguably gone too
far in their contextualization of independence. On the legislative side, the
creation of endless, idiosyncratic forms of independence increases the cost of
figuring out which rules apply in any given context.305 Judicial decisions
muddy the waters further. Agency-specific precedents do not tell other agen-
cies much.306 Moreover, because of the narrow, thinly theorized decisions
299 . See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 773 (critiquing the federal approach of “in-
fer[ring] an additional feature of independence from the presence of another feature of inde-
pendence”).
300 . SeeManning, supra note 26.
301. In the state context, Jonathan Zasloff has urged that “[i]t makes no sense to deal in
abstractions” regarding the separation of powers. Zasloff, supra, note 154, at 1101. Zasloff not-
ed a number of cases (separate from the issue of agency independence) where state courts were
dealing in such abstractions. Id . at 1087–93.
302 . SeeManning, supra note 26, at 2006–08.
303 . See, e .g ., Gardner, supra note 49, at 781 (“Just as striking as the infrequency of state
constitutional decisions, and undoubtedly one of its causes, is what can only be characterized
as a general unwillingness among state supreme courts to engage in any kind of analysis of the
state constitution at all.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separa-
tion of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 103 (1998) (characterizing state
courts as “less assertive in defining and enforcing constitutional rights” and “reluctan[t] to en-
gage in independent interpretation of the state constitution”).
304 . See, e .g ., Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1703–04 (2014).
305. For a similar defense of standardization in the field of property law, see Thomas W.
Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 30 (2000).
306 . See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 296, at 574 (noting that agency-specific law in-
creases “the costs associated with correctly ascertaining the applicable doctrine”).
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about selection, supervision, and removal, such cases may not even provide
much notice to the agency covered by the precedent. To be sure, much of the
messiness of the law of independence is because state constitutions them-
selves are messy, and so the uncertainty is not a problem that state courts
alone have caused. But any accounting of advantages and disadvantages in
this context must wrestle with a world in which most members of the legal
community, and even the officials themselves, harbor significant uncertainty
about their legal independence. I take up that question next.
B. Cooperation or Conflict?
So far I have suggested that the state approach to independence, partly
because of its bespoke and evolving nature, and partly because of the nar-
rowness of relevant precedents, breeds uncertainty about legal rules. Is that a
benefit or cost?
To be sure, ambiguity may be salutary in some circumstances. Most rel-
evant here, scholars of law and economics have predicted that vague legal
rules will sometimes lead to overcompliance.307 Overcompliance may prove
advantageous by avoiding costly and distracting conflicts. A governor and an
attorney general may work to find common ground on a litigation position
so as to avoid distracting litigation about which one of them has ultimate au-
thority to set the state’s position.308 Or an “independent commission” may
tolerate gubernatorial interventions that are of ambiguous legality so as to
move ahead with important policy choices. To the extent that the ambiguity
of the state law on independence drives officials to avoid conflicts over who
has the power to decide matters of policy, state officials can focus their time
and budgets on making those policy decisions.
But uncertainty about the respective obligations of governors, legisla-
tures, and other executive officials may also generate costs. To begin, the
likelihood of the sort of cooperation just described depends on contingent
assumptions. A state official unsure of her legal authority is more likely to
push the envelope rather than cooperate when the risk of sanction is low and
the potential gains from pushing the envelope are high.309 These criteria are
context specific, but it is not farfetched that they will apply. Consider the at-
torney general and governor who choose to litigate a question of their re-
spective authority rather than submit to the other’s divergent policy
preference. Each official will have to spend time and (public) funds on the
307. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 40, at 979–82 (describing, in other contexts, circum-
stances in which uncertainty regarding legal rules may cause overcompliance with the rule).
308 . See Scott Dolan, Up for a Challenge: Maine Governor vs . Attorney General,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.pressherald.com/2015/02/22/up-for-a-
challenge/ [https://perma.cc/5U9L-CXMZ] (quoting former Governor John Baldacci as saying,
of his relationship with then–Attorney General Janet Mills: “There will always be agreements
and disagreements on particular issues, but those get resolved,” and “[w]e found ways to work
together”).
309 . Cf . Calfee & Craswell, supra note 40, at 981–82.
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litigation over authority, but that may defer or prevent the bad policy deci-
sion they want to avoid. In some cases, the litigation may also elevate either
or both of the officials’ public profiles in politically advantageous ways.
Other studies suggest that actors “faced with ambiguity” will tend to “be
biased in a manner that favors themselves.”310 Such biases would seem to
make it more likely that state officials will push the envelope in their own fa-
vor—especially, again, where the potential advantages of winning are signifi-
cant and the costs of losing are manageable.
If state officials are frequently locked in disputes over their authority, the
persistent conflict will impose costs on the public. For one, a system in which
the rules of the game are unsettled adds costs (to the public fisc) to each de-
cision.311 Moreover, in some cases, the lack of clarity may stymie policymak-
ing or dispute resolution altogether. For example, the Supreme Court has
recently denied certiorari in part because of disagreement among the liti-
gants regarding who could speak for the state.312
C. Democratic Values
Another important variable to consider is the democratic pedigree of
state agency independence. In some circumstances, both the legislative speci-
ficity and the frequent revision of structures of independence seem to be
promising antidotes to the fear that independent agencies lack democratic
accountability. But some tinkering with independence suggests an unattrac-
tive version of democratic behavior, and in some instances democracy (and
majoritarianism in particular) is a curious value to prioritize in the first
place.
On the benefits side, there may be something satisfyingly democratic
about the relative frequency of legislative revision of state agency independ-
ence. When state legislatures rein in wayward agencies for greater central-
ized oversight, they seem to avoid the concern that the administrative state
“may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”313
Even when the legislative change enhances independence, the legislature’s
willingness to revisit that choice mitigates the risk of serious departures from
the public will. Thus, if a leading modern fear of independent agencies is
their potential disconnect from the public will, then state legislatures’ greater
310. Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 177
(1992).
311 . See Levinson, supra note 33, at 673–74.
312 . See North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400
(2017) (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting denial of certiorari); see also Me. Mun. Ass’n v.
Mayhew, 64 F. Supp. 3d 251, 267 (D. Me. 2014) (declining federal jurisdiction because,
“though immigration policy is largely a federal concern, in the context of this internecine dis-
pute between elected Maine officials, the federal court would risk meddling in a dispute that
resonates with state governmental and policy concerns”).
313. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
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appetite for structural revision seems a promising solution. For example, if a
state public utilities commission makes an unpopular decision—say, charg-
ing consumers for a failed nuclear plant,314 or failing to inspect pipelines that
later explode315—a subsequent legislative effort to make that commission less
independent, and thus more susceptible to oversight by elected principals,
seems like a sound channeling of the public’s disapproval.
Yet there are reasons to doubt that revisions to independence are typi-
cally so responsive to the public will. More fundamentally, it is not clear that
public responsiveness is what we should want from independent agencies.
First, legislative revisions of agency independence sometimes seem like
raw partisanship, or actions intended to benefit the party itself rather than
any public majority.316 These sorts of actions swap the shine of democratic
responsiveness with a coarser vision of partisan battle—one that is hard to
defend on good-government grounds. For example, state legislatures on
both sides of the aisle have altered the powers of their governor or attorney
general immediately after a political opponent won election to that post.317
The actual choices about the content of the official’s power might be desira-
ble on other grounds, but it is hard to see why we should appreciate them as
faithful legislative channeling of the public will (particularly where the public
just elected both the legislature and the demoted official).
Perhaps more importantly, more work would need to be done to estab-
lish whether and when accountability, and majoritarian accountability in
particular, are appropriate values to prioritize for state agencies, either as a
matter of state constitutional law or otherwise. Undoubtedly, notions of ac-
countability have been central to state constitutional development, but as
Part II described, parsing those layers of activity is complex. If the desire for
accountability is untethered from the state constitution, then it must navi-
gate the academic literature showing that accountability is not an unalloyed
good.318 For present purposes, it suffices to note that one common rationale
for agency independence is political neutrality.319 The more one believes that
an agency’s decision needs to be based on factors other than public prefer-
314 . See Brown, supra note 250.
315 . See Seifter, supra note 43, at 159–60 (describing California scandal involving the San
Bruno pipeline explosion).
316. This aligns with what Justin Levitt calls “tribal partisanship.” Justin Levitt, The Parti-
sanship Spectrum, 55 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2014) (describing the term as involving
activity undertaken “purely” to benefit one’s political party, “wholly divorced from—or . . .
contrary to[] the policymaker’s conception of the policy’s other merits”).
317 . See supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
318. For a concise summary of five types of critiques of accountability, see Jacob E.
Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 187 n.6
(2014).
319. To be sure, as this Article has indicated, that is not the only rationale for creating
officials with some degree of insulation from the governor. Elected executive officials, in par-
ticular, undermine the idea of the supposed dichotomy of independence and accountability.
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ences, the less one is appeased by institutional design that favors majoritari-
anism. The next Section pursues this idea further.
D. Independence
The state approach to independence seems to undermine independence
overall. Why might this undermining occur? First, the power dynamics in
most states in the era of gubernatorial administration make it more likely
that governors dominate in negotiations over independence where the legal
rule is unclear. 320 This is partly because, as at the federal level, there is reason
to expect the chief executive’s appointees (or members of her party) to be
loyal.321 But the effect is likely amplified in the states, where there will often
be neither a clear law nor a strong norm against a particular gubernatorial
intervention. In that situation, even a political opponent of the governor (es-
pecially one who lacks the political prominence of, say, the attorney general)
may not be able to justify the private and public costs of resistance.
The legislative habit of continually revising independence also under-
mines it in a more fundamental sense. The point of independence is that de-
cisionmakers can do their work insulated from politics. But if revising
independence itself is part of ordinary politics, then “independent” deci-
sionmakers do need to pay attention to politics or risk losing their independ-
ence.
Whether this is a benefit or a cost is a freighted question best considered
in particular contexts. In some instances, reduced independence will be a
benefit. As I have written elsewhere, concentrating power in the governor
can yield more efficient, effective, and transparent state government, even as
it also raises the problems of concentrated executive power.322 But states
make some agencies and offices independent for good reason. The irony of
this variegated, evolving state approach is that in the effort to get independ-
ence just right, state officials may create an atmosphere that inhibits inde-
pendence. If the rules of independence are murky, ever-changing, and
different for each agency, and if those factors occur in a legal community
where independence is not a salient topic, then state agency independence
will be harder to forge and sustain, even where state governments intend to
do just that.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the concept of agency independence in the
states is more variegated and unstable than in the federal government and
320 . See generally Seifter, supra note 17 (discussing the modern regime of gubernatorial
administration, including how and why governors have gained authority).
321 . See Devins & Lewis, supra note 262, at 461. But see Keith S. Brown & Adam Can-
deub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 790 (2010) (finding that,
at the FCC, “party affiliation does not drive voting to the degree one might expect”).
322 . See Seifter, supra note 17.
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has attempted to refute the conventional wisdom that states’ “plural execu-
tive” structure necessarily produces significant independence from the gov-
ernor. Furthermore, I have argued that precisely because independence is so
variegated, unstable, and prone to legislative revision, it often amounts to a
weak norm. By placing agency independence roughly on the plane of ordi-
nary politics, the states have made it more tailored, but also more fragile.
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